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You can choose your kiends but the Internal Revenue Code chooses your 
family, at least for estate tax purposes. In broad terms, the estate tax 
provisions of Chapter 12 of the Internal Revenue Code' impose a tax on any 
gratuitous death-time transfer by an individual.' For the most part, precise tax 
liability will depend on the amount of the transfer.' Estate tax liability also 
may depend on the identity and even the business activities of the transferor, 
the transferee and each of their respective "family" members.' Depending on 
the particular Code section involved: however, the term "family" has widely 
divergent meanings for estate tax purposes? Indeed the federal estate tax laws 
employ terms like "family" and"re1ated" in ways that conflict with each other 
and with lay understandings of the word.7 A uniform definition would make 
1. I.R.C. $8 2001-2210. 
2. Id. 9 2001(a) ("Atax is hereby imposed on the transfer of the taxable estate of evay decedent 
who is a citizen or resident of the United States."). 
3. See id. 5 2001(b) (computation ofestate tax). 
4. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text; see also infra Pait LB.3 (for purposes of 
8 2032A, "qualified use" of property may be by decedent or certain members of decedent's family). 
5. The discussion here is limited to three specific esfate tax provisions: $4 2036(a), 2032A and 
6166. There are other tax mles in which the definition of "fami1y"ptays an important role, but they are 
beyond the scope of this discussion. See, e.g., I.R.C. 8 2057 (deduction for family-owned business 
interests); see also infra note 7. 
6. See infra notes 27,39-43,72-77, 125-27 and accompanying text. 
7. The estate tax definitions of "Eamily" conflict not only with each other, but with the way the 
same term is used in other parts of the C d e ,  inchding the gift tax-like provisions of Chapter 14 and the 
generationskippingtransfer tax rules ofchapter 13. See, e.g., LR.C. $5 2701 (specialvalnation rules in 
case of transfers of interests in corporations or partnerships), 2702 (special valuation mles in case of 
transfers of intaests in tmst), 2704 (treatment of certain lapsing rights and restrictions); cf id $5 267 
(income tax limitation on deductions for losses on transactions behveen related taxpayers), 2651(e) (for 
generationskipping transfer taxpurposes, special generation asrignmat mles in the case of persons with 
apredeceasedparent), 1361 (incornetaxdefinitionofScorporation), 1563(e)(constructiveownershiprules 
for purposes of definition of "controlled group of corporations" and limitation on multiple income tax 
benefits). Since the enacment ofthe American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357,s 232, 
118 Stat. 1418,1434 (codified at LR.C. 5 1361@)(1)(A)), S corporations may have 103 shareholdas (the 
limit previously was 75). Forpurposes of the shareholder limit of 5 1361, "family" members are treated 
as one shareholder. I.R.C. 9 1361(c)(l)(AXii). "Family" includes all lineal descendants and spouses or 
former spouses of all lineal descendants of a common ancesmr not more than six generations from the 
youngest shareholder who otherwise would be considered a member of the family. Id. 
$ 136l(c)(l)(B)(i)Qi). There hasnot yet been any significant scholarship on the American Jobs Creation 
Actof2004 Forpractitioner-orienteddiscussionsoftherecentchanges to $ 136 1, seeMalthew A. Melone, 
S Cornoration Rules Liberalized bv the Ameriean Jobs Creation Act of2006 Bus. ENTITIES, Mar.-Am. 
2UU5. at 20, lay \I. Miyssaki. Esro~e Plam~iling Updore, in ADVANCED ESTATE PLANNWG T F C H ~ I V U E S  
2U05, at I (.ZL1-Anr\ CLE. Cuune of Studicr hlaterinl No. SK059.2005); Stefan F Tucker& Bnan S 
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the law easier to apply, but it would result in systematic over-taxation or 
under-taxation. Instead the statutes should be revised to use unique terms that 
apply for limited purposes. 
To explore the conflicting estate tax meanings of family, Part I of this 
Article examines in detail three complex Code sections.' Part I first examines 
$ 2036(a)9 and its rule for the estate tax inclusion of assets over which a 
taxpayer-decedent retains benefrtorcontr01.~~ Part Inext examines 5 2032A's 
special valuation rule for real estate" before turning to a third Code section, 
Masterson. RecenlDevelo~menD AffcclhzRealEsfae andpass Throuph ~ n t i ~ i & ,  in SEVENTH ANNUAL 
REALE~TATETAXFORUMII (PLIT~~L&& fist. Plan. hactice~ourse,kandbook~eries~o. 644,2005). 
8. See supra note 5. As a related matter, the discussion of the confliotmx meanings of family in 
estatetax law a lk  invites largerquestions, bepnd the scope of this Article, abou;theunde&ngp&ose 
of wealth transfer taxation. Those who favor the tax believe that estate taxation is a crucial tool of 
economicredishibution, needed tobreakup concatrations of inherited wealth: 'lI]fthe diffisionofwealth 
is to be preferred to its concentration in the hands of those wim have not prcduced il-end this seems to 
be the prevailing trend of public opinion-the inhexitance tax offers a simple expedient forbringing about 
that result." Peter V. Ross,lnheritmce Taxation, 19 CASE & COMMENT 452,453 (1913), quoted in R A  
MARK BLOOM ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF ESTATES, TRUSTS, AND GIFTS 12 (3d ed. 2003); see also 
Andrew Cameeie, IKeslth, 391 N. AM. REV. 653.659 (1889) ('By taxingestates heavily at death the State 
marks its condemnation of the selfish rniltlonaire's unwo~ihy life."). ~ r ~ o n e n t s  of tho state tax also 
describe the tax as the price a citizca pays for a demacratic political system that protects economic and 
personal freedoms. B L ~ O M ,  $*pa, at7.i-22 rMen who continue hoarding great sums all their Eves, the 
use of which foroublic ends would wcsk good in the emmunity from which it chiefly came, should be 
. 
made to feel that the community, in the form ofthe Statc, rannot thus br drpri\cdof iur sharr."); seealso 
W~LLV~~IH.G,~TEF.SR.&CHLC~COLL~VS.WEAL?IJ WDO~:RCO~IMONWEAI.TII: WIIY ~~ILHICASIIOULD 
TAX ACCUMULATED FORTUNES, at xi (2002) ("Americans who possess p a t  wealth have a special 
obligation to my back a debt to socieiy."). In contrast, those who oppose the estate tax believe that it 
. . . ~ 
tmproprrly penalrrcs iuccrss and unjustly infringes an personal property nghts 
[Tlhcnghttotranrf~~weahhhasthc poirivcvaluesof tbslcnng inclnl~resin thefonnofrclvardmg 
- .  - 
industry, ingenuity and creat~ity, encoumgingcapifalformtion thmugh savingsand investment, 
permiuinacontinuity ofongoingentemtise,and suppo@ingdiversityinpriorities. Inaddition,such 
h-ansfets are, indeed, ohnjustified by signiticani if not always evident, economic cowtibutions 
by those &o receivethem. 
Ross, s u p ,  at 13. The Congressional Budget Office has suggested that 'ye]conomic studies have had 
limited success in identiiling how the estate taxmay influence the behavior of farmers andsmall-business 
~. 
swncts . . . . A large body ofrescarch has found tha inwmc !axes may dtscounge entrrprencunal r f f~v t  
. . . [qhe estate tar may also reduce mlreprcnrurial effort." CUNG BUDGET OFF!% I:FFECIS OF T l l E  
FEurn.\l. EsrATtTaxou FAKMSANDSIIALL B SINESS~S, at vui (2005). Eaehofth~seposit~cms is dr.eply 
fvlr b) ordinary ririzens and poli"cimna1ikr. Agaiml this backdrop. Congress cngages in heated debater 
over the fuhlre of the esbto &. Joel Havemaan, A Rare Accord: Almost Everyone Dislikes Budget, L.A. 
TIMES, July 31,2005, at A-31. 
9. I.R.C. $ 2036(a) (inclusion in gross estate the value of transfers with respect to which the 
decedmt retained the right to "the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to iocome from, the property, 
or the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or 
enjoy the properiy or the income therefrom."). 
10. Id. 
11. Id $20326 
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8 6166, and its rule for a ten-year1' extension of time to pay estate tax if the 
requisite percentage of a decedent's estate consists of "family"-owned 
business interests andmeets other tests.I3 Undereachofthese sections, family 
is defined differently, making mastery and application of the law excessively 
challenging. 
Part I1 of this Article explores the legislative history of each of 
$5 2036(a), 2032A and 6166 in an effort to elucidate the relationship between 
the purpose and function of these Code sections and their unique definitions 
of "family."" Each Code section operates differently in the estate tax system. 
Section 2036(a), for example, functions to determine the scope of the gross 
estate, causing estate tax inclusion where a decedent maintains a certain level 
of control over transferred property. Section 2032A, in contrast, is a valuation 
rule that aims to reduce estate tax and enhance the probability of a family's 
retaining ownership of a farm or other business. Finally 8 6166 is an estate 
tax payment rule that carefully defines the types of taxpayers who will have 
more time to pay taxes. 
Part III moves beyond an analysis of the specific Code sections to a 
discussion of contemporary experiences of the family. Many modern families 
do not resemble the traditional model of two married parents with shared 
~hildren.'~ Although the estate tax rules contemplate some family structures 
that depart from the traditional model, they do not acknowledge, let alone 
accord tax benefits to, the full range of associational relationships that 
function in fact as "families."16 This Part critiques the estate tax law's 
12. This ten-year extension may be combined with the defeml under 5 6166(a)(3). Under 
5 6166(a)(3), "the executor may elect to deferpaying the taxathibutable to a closelyheld business interest 
for up to five years." BORIS I. B I ~ E R E T  AL., FEDERAL ESTATEAND GIFTTAXATION 715 (8th ed. 2000). 
Becauseof theovedap in the first year of the ten-year and five-year periods, the cumulative extension may 
last up to fourteen years. LR.C. $6166(a)(l)-(3). See generally BlrTKERET AL., supra, at 715. 
13. I.R.C. 5 6166(aKI)(atatemay beeligibiefora defenal in thepaymmt ofatatetaxwhere the 
value of a "closely held business" exceeds 35% of the adjusted gross atate). See infra note 107 and 
accompanying text. 
14. See hfra Part n. 
15. See infro Part III. 
16. For example. Dursuant to the Defense ofMarriaee Act. Pub. L No. IM-199, 110 Stat. 2419 
- .. - 
(1996) [hereinafter DOMA], signed by President Clinton in 1996, far federal law purposes, "the word 
'maniage' means only a legal unirm between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 
'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife." 1 U.S.C. 8 7 (2006). 
Notwithstanding a particular state's rules allauinz same-sex couples to many, then, thecouple seemingly 
- .  - .. 
wouldnot be consideredmanied for federal tax ppuroses. For a superb comprehensive discussion of tax, 
estate planning., and otha Legal issues facing same-sex couples, see Derek B. Dom,NavieatinetheSame- 
. - .  
5e.r . /orno~elu,~dscape ,  38 S.Y. ST. 8.A.  Tn. & EST. S E C T I U ~  NEWSLLTIER 16 (2005) For a schoi=rly 
dtsrurrion of consi~rutlonal aspcrs of DOMA xr .  for example. Deborah A. Bans. Repcat OOMA, 30 
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approaches to defining the family and suggests that the Code misunderstands 
how families function in fact. 
Part IV considers solutions to the conflicting estate tax definitions of 
family. This Part first addresses the possible adoption of a uniformdefinition 
of family forestate taxp~rposes!~ Because each of $8 2036,2032A and6166 
intends to accomplish very different results, a single defmition of family 
would result in the taxation of too few transactions or too many transactions. 
This Part also considers eliminating rules that penalize taxpayers or award 
preferences to them based on family relationships, eliminating only the 
preferential provisions andincreasing the estatetaxexemption. Increasing the 
estate tax exemption may decrease the number of estates affected by the 
complex laws, but does nothingto solve the larger problem. These proposals 
are individually and collectively incomplete. Part IV insteadembraces a fifth 
proposal to revise the statutes to use terms like Attribution Group, Qualified 
Heir Group and Closely Held Business Associates in place of "family" and 
"related" persons. These unique terms will minimize complexity, help 
achieve statutory integrity and bring the estate tax definitions in line with the 
rules' underlying policies. 
HUM. RTS. 2 (2004); Brett P. Ryan, Love and LelLove: Same-Sex Mnrrioge, Post, Present ondFuture, 
and the Const8utionali&ofDOMA, 22 U .  t5Aw.L. REV. 185 (2000); Mark Strasser,DOMA and the Two 
Faces of Federalism, 32 CKaronToN L. REV. 457 (1998); Mark StIasser, The Priw'leges ofNolional 
Citizenship: On Saenz. Same-SexCouplasandYreRigktto Travel, 52Rw~ans L. REV. 553 (2000); Evan 
Wolhon & Michael P. Melcher, The Supreme Court's &cision in Romer v. Evans ond Its Implications 
/or the Definse of Marriuge Act, I16 QUlNNwlAc L. REV. 217 (1996); Note, Litigaring the Defense of 
h4ammageAct: The NexfBottlegroundforSam+Se~Ma~rioge~ I17 H ~ n v .  L.REV. 2684 (2004); AnitaY. 
Woudenbes Note, GivingDOMA Some Credit: The Yclidiily of Applying Defense of Marriage Acts lo 
Civil Unions Under the FuN Foish end Credit Clause, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 1509 (2004). 
17. Although beyond the scope of this Article, the same reasoning would tend to suggest tbe 
rejection of a uniform dofinition of family for all wealth hansfer tax purposes (i.e., gitt, estate and 
generation-skipping taxes). 
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A. The Scope of the Gross Estate 
1 .  I.R.C. $2036(a)(l) and1.R.C. $ 2036@)(2): Transfers With a Retained 
Interest 
The basic rule of 8 2036(a)(l) is that a decedent may not avoid estate 
taxation if he or she transfers property to another but retains some benefit 
from the property. Specifically under 5 2036(a)(1), the value ofa decedent's 
gross estate includes the value of "all property to the extent of any interest 
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer. . . by trust or 
otherwise, under which he has retained. . . the possession or enjoyment of, or 
the right to the income from, the property."ls A classic example of a retained 
interest is a life estate.I9 Thus in the case of a hypothetical taxpayer, X, who 
transfers assets to a trust to pay income to X for life, remainder to X's 
daughter, all of the assets in the trust will be included inXs gross estate upon 
X s  death? because X retained the right to income from the property. A 
similar but less well-known example of a retained right that will cause estate 
tax inclusion under 5 2036(a)(l) is the right (whether direct or indirect) to 
vote shares of stock in a "controlled c~rporation."~' For example, where X 
18. I.R.C. $2036(a)(l). Thedecedent'sretentionmaybeforlifeor"forany periodnot ascertainable 
without reference to his death or for any ooiod which does not in fact end beforehis death." Id. A oeriod 
not ascertainable without reference to;L decedent's death exists where the taxpayer retains the hght m 
periodic payments of income fmm transferred prnoem, subiect to the conditian that the decedent's r i ~ h t  
. ~ . . .  . 
torrcci\e tnmrneterm>naresat heconcluianofthelast fullpcriod~mmediately priortodcath. Treas Reg. 
$ 20.2036-l(b)(l)G) (as arnrnded in 1960,: see also STEPIIAUIE J .  WIILBANKS, FEDERAL TAXATION OF 
WEALTH TRANSFERS 241-42 (2004). 
19. See 1.R.C. 5 2036(a)(I): Treas. Reg. 6 20.2036-l(a) (as amended in 1960). For a thorough 
- .  
anal pis oft he application of^ 2036(a)to alineofcases involving family limited pannenhips, re? Ronald 
H. Jensen. The .Mop,c ofDlsoppeorinp IVeolth Revisired Urinp Funlily Ltmrtrd Pormcr~hipr lo Reduce 
Estate and Gift T& 1 PITT. TAX. RE;. 155 (2004). 
20. Note that the full value of the trust will be included in the decedent's gross estate even though 
her transfer to the trust was complete for gift tax purposes. See I.R.C. $ 2501(a) (imposition of tax on 
giRs); Treas. Rep, 5 25.251 1-2(b) (m amended in 1999) (gift is complete where donor "has so parted with 
dominion and control as to leave inhim no power to change its disposition, whether for his own benefit or 
for the benefit ofanother. . . .!3. Under 8 2702, the value of the transferor's retained interest is valued at 
zero. I.R.C. 5 2702. See generally WILLBANKS, supra note 18, at 243; RICHA~D B. STEPHENS ET AL., 
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFTTAXATION 7 4.08[4][a] (8th ed. 2002). 
21. I.R.C. 8 2036(aXl). @)(I). Forotherexamples dreainedinterests(othathanincome interests) 
that can higgerestatetax inclusion undcr$2036(a)(l), seeEsfoteofRapeljev. Comm'r, 73 T.C.82 (1979) 
(decedent's retention ofright to reside in home &r transferto family members causes estatetax inclusion); 
PITTSBURGH TAX REVIEW 
transfen stock in a "controlled corporation" to a trust fw the benefit o fXs  
son, ifxretains the right (whether outright or in a fiduciary capacity) to vote 
those shares, the value of the shares will be included inXs  gross estate upon 
X's death?' 
The definition of a "controlled corporation" is bound inextricably with 
the definition of family. Section 2036(b)(2) defines a controlled corporation 
as one in which the decedent "owned (with the application of section 3 18), or 
had the right (either alone or in conjunction with any person)" to vote stock 
cartying at Ieast 20% of the aggregate voting power of all stock cla~ses?~ To 
illustrate, consider a transfer by anothet hypothetical taxpayer, this time Dora 
Ewing, a United States citizen who is married and has two adult children. She 
and her ancestors, descendants and collateral relatives are shown in Figure A. 
Each person's relationship to the taxpayer is indicated in italics. 
Estate ofMmnvell v. Comm'r, 3 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 1993) (decedent's transfer of home to family members 
is not a bona fidc sale for foil and adequate considaation where decedent's rent payments approximate 
xnounts doe undcr niongage and past due rea was not collected). 
2:. I R C  I. 2036taN 1 r .  ~ b ) ( l ) .  The <slatetax inclur~an applterif the voting right is held a1 death. 
. . . . . . . . . 
In addition, it may apply if the voting right was held within &&years of death. See 1.R.C. $ 2035(a); 
STEPHENS ET AL., Supra note 20,74.08[6][d]. 
23. I.R.C. 6 2036(b)(2). Ownership is defined forpurposes of 8 2036@)(2) by reference to $ 318. 
See in& notes 26-27 and text accompanying note 31. It is himaterial whether the voting right is 
exercisable by the decedent alone or in conjunction with another penon. I.RC. 9 2036@)(2). 
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Hvootheticai 1. Assume that DoraEwing owns 20% of Company Y's total outstanding 0 .  
,tack Company Y has only one class of stock, and 311 shares have the samr vorlng 
nrhts Pursuant to Comanv Y's by-laws and thesppl~cableshareholderagreemnt, any 
scareholder may transf2 a<underiying equity int&ist in stock without also transferring 
the voting rights associated with the stock. One year before her death, Dora Ewing 
transfers to Friend Frank, an unrelated third party not shown in Figure A, theunderlying 
equity interest in all of her Company Y stock. At the time of her death, Dora Ewmg 
retains the right to vote the shares. 
Because Dora Ewing transfers to Friend Frank her underlying equity interest 
in the stock, but retains the right to vote the shares, she has at her death the 
right to vote at least 20% of the total combined voting power of Company Y 
stock. This is true even though she no longer owns the underlying equity. 
Therefore, within the meaning of 9 2036@)(2), Company Y is a controlled 
10 PITTSBURGH TAX REVIEW p o l .  3:l 
corporation with respect to DoraE~ing.2~ Her retained right to vote shares in 
a controlled corporation constitutes a right to possession or enjoyment of 
transferred property for purposes of 5 2036(a)(1), causing the full value of the 
Company Y stock to be included in Dora Eviing's gross estate:' 
Note that 5 2036(h)(2)'s definition of a controlled corporation focuses on 
the ownership of more persons than just the taxpayer-transferor. This section 
invokes the constructive ownership rules of 31826 for the determination of 
a taxpayer-transferor's ownership. Under 5 318, an individual is deemed to 
own any stock that is owned (whether directly or indirectly), by or for "(i) his 
spouse (otherthan a spouse who is legally separated from the individual under 
a decree of divorce or separate maintenance), and (ii) his children, 
grandchildren, and parents.'"' For purposes of 2036(b)(2)'s definition of 
controlled corporation, then, examination must be made ofthe holdings ofthe 
taxpayer-transferor, his or her spouse, children, grandchildren and parents. 
Even if the taxpayer personally owns a very small percentage of the stock (or 
even none at all), and the corporation initially does not appear to be a 
"controlled corporation" with respect to the taxpayer, the attribution to the 
taxpayer of the holdings of his or her family members can have unexpected 
consequen~es.'~ Consider again the family of Dora Ewing. 
Hypothetkal2. Assume the same facts as in Hrpothetical 1, except that Dora Ewing 
owns 5% ofcompany Y's total outstanding stock. Dora Ewing again transfbrs to Friend 
Frank her underlying equity interest in all of her Company Y stock. At the time ofher 
death, Dora Ewing retains the right to vote the shares and her father, William Ewing, 
owns 95% of the Company Y stock. 
At first glance it might appear that Dora Ewing can avoid the application of 
5 2036(h)(2) (and therefore 5 2036(a)(l)) because she personally has the right 
to vote only five percent of Company Y stock.29 Unfortunately for Dora 
Ewing, under the constructive ownership rules of 5 318 she owns her father's 
95% interest, making Company Y a controlled corporation with respect to 
her.30 Thus as in Hypothetical 1, the full value of the stock transferred to 
24. I.R.C. $ 2036@)(2). 
25. Id. $203Ma)fl). 
26. Id. 2036&(2\. 
27. Id. d. 318(a)(l)(A). On gender-neuhaliryin the Code, see id. 8 7701(oX1)(3)and 1 U.S.C. 5 1 
(2006) ("wo~ds importing the masculine gender include the feminine as well"). 
28. I.R.C. 6 2036(b)(2). 
. .. . 
29. Id. 
30. Id. The statutory language of $2036@)(2) makes the attribution ~ I e s  of $318 applicable only 
to adetermination ofownetship levels. tn contrast, the proposed regulations under $2036 suggest that the 
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Friend Frank will be included in Dora Ewing's gross estate under 
$ 2036(a)(1)." 
attribution rules apply to determination of stock ownership and voting rights. Prop. Treas. Reg. 
5 20.2036-2(d)(l), 48 Fed. Reg. 35,143 (Aug. 3,1983) ("For purposes of this section, the term 'controlled 
corpmation'means acorporationin whichthe deeden$ with theapplication ofthe constructive ownenhip 
rules of section 318. is d e e d  to own or have a rinht to vote stock possessing at least hventy percent of 
. ~ ~ 
the tawl combined voting poucr ofall elasses of stock.^. At leas one treatise suggeststhat thisproposed 
rermlalion is"draRedtw broadly also in wrmining use ofsection 318a1tributian to determine ~hcponian 
of;otingrights. Prop. Reg. 5 26.2036-i(d)(l) should beamended to permit attribution only to dgenninc 
ownershirr. not to determinevotinn riphts." STEPHENS ET AL., Supra notc 20,¶4.08 n.97; see also PAUL 
R. ~ I C U A N I E L  FT AL., FEDEIUL-WEALTH TRANSFER T A X A T W ~  247 (5th ed. 2002) ("Prop. Reg. 
$20.2036-2(d)(l) (1983) appean to apply the ambution rules of§  318tothe votingpower as wdl as to 
the ownership test, a quest~anabk interpretation of $ 2036(b)."): MYRON KOVF & JAMES KOSAKOW, 
I ~ A Y D L I N G  FEDERAL ESTATE& GIFTTAXES 2-197 (6th ed. 2004)("[t]heconsl~ctiveownaship rules of 
I R S ,  rj  318 would not be used to attribute retention of voting rights to the decedent"); Steve R. Akero. 
Srlecrtun o/Tmsaes: A Dero,ledR~v;ew of Gifl. Errore ond lnmme Tar Eflecrsond Non-TaxEffPro, 38 
U. MIAMI &ST. ON EST. PLAN. 3-1.3-57 (2004) ('.the mere fact that persons whose ownership of stock 
would be attributed to the grantor under Section 318 have the right to vote stock will not be treated as a 
retention ofvoting power by thegrantor"); CJNORMAN H. LANEBLHOWARD ZARI~SKY,FEDERALINCOME 
TAXATION OF ESTATES AND TRUSTS 11-23 (3d ed. 2003) (chimingwithout analysis that amibution mles 
apply to a determination of voting rights); Susan C. Fmzi ,  The Fedml Estate Tar, in UNDERSTANDING 
ESTATE, GIFT & GENERATION-SKIPPINO TRANSFER TAXES 2002, at 95, 117-18 (PLI NY Practice Skills 
Course, Handbook Series No. 118,2002) (claiming without analysis that the attribution rules apply to a 
determination of voting rights). 
The proposed regulations under 2036 are promulgated pursuant to the general interpretative 
authority granted to the Treasury Depafinent under 8 7805(a). Although interpretive regulations do not 
have the force of law, they nevatheless may begiven substantial deference by an in tqe t ing  court if the 
statute is found to be ambiguous. See Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 844(1984)(legislativ~regulafionsarevalidunless"arbitra~y, capricious,or manifestly conlrarytothe 
statute"); see also Mitchell M. Gans,Deference andtheEndof Tar Practice, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. &TR. 
J. 731,751 (2002) ("Under Chevron, once acourt finds that a stature is ambiguouq the court is obliged to 
defer to any reasonable resolution of the ambiguity embodied in a regulation--provided Congress 
contemplated that theagency would haw interpretive authorityand the agency issues its interpregfion in 
a f m a t  Congress anticipated would be binding on the courts."). Where a stahtte directly addresses a 
question, however, a regulation "is not considered such a permissible construction or reasonable 
interpretation unles it hamwnizes both with the statutory language and with the astute's origin and 
ournose." Waltonv. Comm'r. 115 T.C. 589.598 (2000). In thiscase,Proo. Treas. Reg. 6 20.2036-2(d)(l), 
. . . . .  . . .. . . .  . 
48 Fed. Reg. 35,143 (Aug. 3,1983), seems to diictly conhadict thestatuteand therefare likely would not 
be considered a oermissible construction of 6 2036. Nevertheless, as the l awage  of the proposed 
. . . . 
regulations indicates the Service's litigatingposition with respect to the aggregation of voting rights, the 
orooosed rermlations should be taken into account. 
. . - 
31. I.R.C. 5 2036(b)(l)-(2). Forthepurposesofdetenniningwhat isacontrolledcorporationwithin 
the meanineof 8 2036(b)(2).reattribution rules mayapplyto render anentitya contmlled cornoration- with 
. .. . 
re,pect to ;decedent 'ti..$ 318(a)(5)(A). Section 318 provides not only that an indiiidualis deoned lo 
cwnthc stmk hcldby theindiv!dual's spouse.children,grandchildrcn andparents,id. 9 318(a)(l), but also 
that stack awned dtrectly or mdirectly by a partnership, estate, trust or corporation may be annbuted to the 
Darmsra, bcneficianes or owna;. Id. $ 3  lX(aX2XAHC). In other wads, therearccircum~lnncor in which 
. . . . . . . . . H decedent may be deemed to own stock held in rmst for the benefit of a family member. Id. 
$5 31 8(a)(2)@), 2036@)(2). To illustrate, consider a variation on Hypothetical 2 above. 
i 
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2. LR.C. $ 2036(a)(2): Transfers With a Retained Right to Designate 
Possession or Enjoyment of Property 
Just as 5 2036(a)(1) includes in a decedent's gross estate pmperty with 
respect to which the decedent retained certain benefits from the transferred 
pro~erty,9~ $2036(a)(2) includes in a decedent's gross estate the value of all 
property to the extent that the decedent retains the right to designate the 
persons who benefit from the transferred pr~perty.'~ Estate tax inclusion 
under $ 2036(a)(2) commonly arises in situations in which a transferor- 
decedent retains discretionary authority over assets transferred to a t r~s t .9~ 
There are also situations where a transferor-decedent retains rights to remove 
and replace a person (typically a trustee) who has the authority to make 
discretionary distributions of assets transferred to a tru~t.9~ Specifically, the 
Hypothetical 2%. Assume the same facts as in Hypothetical 1, mcept &at Dora Ewingowns 5% 
ofCompanyY'stotaloutstandingstock. DoraEwingagainbansfers toFriendFrankherunderlying 
equityinterest in all of her Company Y stock. Dora Ewingretains the right to vote the shares. At 
the time of Dora Ewing's death, 95% of the Company Y stock is held in a trust. Dora Ewing's 
father, William Ewing, holds aplesent interest and a vested remainder in the trust. His interest has 
an actuariallysomputed value equal to 100% of the tnrst property. 
Tnrough application ofthe rettribution rules, Company Y will beconsidered for purposes of $2036@)(2) 
to be a controlled corporatioo with resped to Dora Ewing. First, the stock hold in the rmn for William 
Ewing's benefit is athihuted toWiilliamEwingunder 5 3 18(a)[2)(B)(). That section provides thatc'[s]tock 
owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a trust . . . shall be considered as owned by its beneficiaries in 
proportion totheacmarial intaestof such beneficiaries in such trust." Id. $338(a)(2)@)(i). Second,under 
the const~ctive ownership mles of 8 318, she owns her father's 95% interest, making Company Y a 
controlled corporation with respect to ha. Id. $8 318(aXI)(A)(ii) (an individual is deemed to own stock 
owned directly or indirectly by a parent), 2036@)(2). 
32. Scesuprn note l8and acconyanying text. 
33. LR.C. $2036(a)(2) (emphasis added). Specifically, 5 2036(a)[2) provides that the decedent 
must have retained this interest for life or any period not ascertainable without reference to ?he decedent's 
death a any pericd that doa  not end before thedecedent's death. See supra note 18 and accompanying 
text. 
34. United States". O'Mallei, 383 U.S. 627 (1966) (finding estate tan inclusion where transferor- 
deccdrnr retainedtbr rightas rrusrcs to p l y  or ?x?caurnularc tlurt lncornr for abcnsficiary,; OldCol~ny Tmsr 
Co. \.United States, 423 f 2d 601 t is t  Clr 197U)lfind~n):erratrtsx inciuslon \rhcrerransfcror-decidmt 
retained the right .& tmitee to indrcase of &st income if "desirable in view of changed 
circumstances"). It is irrelevant for purposes of $ 2036(aXZ) *etherthis power is retamed outlight oiin 
a fiduciary capacity, whether the pbwer is exercisable Pone or in conjunction with others or whether the 
exercise was subject to an uncontrollable contingency that does not occur in fact. Treas. Reg. 
5 20.2036-l@)(3) (as amended in 1960); cf: Rev. Rul. 95-58, 1995-2 CB. 191 (ruling with respect to a 
grantor's reserved power toremoveand replace a trustee that "it is immaterial in what capacity the power 
was exercisable by the decedent."). 
35. See,e.g..EstateafFarrelv.UnitedStates, 553 F,Zd637(Ct. CL 1977) (trust assetsareincluded 
is transferor-decedent's 50ss estate under $ 2036(a)(Z) where transferor-decedent retained the right to 
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Service takes the view that if a transferor-decedent has the power to remove 
a trustee and replace the removed trustee with a family member who is 
"related or subordinate" to the transferor within the meaning of 8 672(c) (and 
to be "related or subordinate,"one must also be "nonadverse"), the trust assets 
will be included in the decedent's gross estate.36 
Under 8 672(c) a related or subordinate party is one who is both (a) 
"nonadverse" and (b) a member of a specific class of  individual^.^^ A 
nonadverse party is a person who does not have any "substantial beneficial 
interest" in a trust that would be adversely affected by the exercise or 
nonexercise of a power with respect to that The specific class of 
individuals includes the taxpayer's spo~se,'~ father, mother, issue, brother or 
appoint a successor trusteq and neither state law nor the vust i n s w e n t  would prohibit trausferor From 
appointing herself as trustee); cf: Estate of Wall v. Comm'r, 101 T.C. 300 (1993) ( W t  assets are not 
included in transfermdecedent's gross estate under 2036(a)(2) wbere transferor-decedent retained the 
right to remove a corporatematee and replace it with another independent corponte mtee). 
36. Rev. Rul. 95-58, 1995-2 C.B. 191. Note, however, that Revenue Ruling 95-58 focuses not on 
the initial appointee, but the class of persons from whom the taxpayer-grantor could choose a successor. 
On the meaning of nonadverse," see in/ra note 38. Although Revenue Ruling 95-58 citesEstale of Wall, 
101 T.C. 300, as support, Estate of Woll makes no reference to the income tax concept of "related or 
subordinatd'parties within themeaning of $672(c). Seealso Brieffor the American CollegeofTrust and 
Estatecounsel as Amicus Curiae Suppotting Petitioner, Estateof Wall v. Comm'r, 101 T.C. 300 (1993) 
(No. 1531 1-9 I). That language instead seems to beimpomd fmm another c a s  cited in Revwue Ruling 
95-58,Estale of Vnkw. Comm'r, 973 FZd 1409 (8thCir. I992). InEstatcofVak, thecourtaddrcssed the 
gin tax consequences of a grantor's retained power to remove trustees and replace them withtrustees who 
werenot related or subordinate parties within the meaning ofa 672(c). Such a power did not cause the gin 
to be incomplete for gin taxpurposes, accanfing to the court. Estate of Yak, 973 F.2d at 1414. Note, 
however, that as in Revenue Ruling95-58,Estateof Yakwas concemedespeciaky with theclass ofpcnons 
@om whom the taxoawr-amtor could choose a successor hustee. 
. .  v 
Theconcept o f  related or subordinateWparties is an income taxconcept under $672(c) that has been 
maned to the estate tax laws for oumoses of 6 2036(a)(2). For another examole of the ways that income - . . , .. . 
tax mles have been incorporated into estate tax mles, see, for example, Treas. Reg. $20.2042-I(c)(6) (as 
amended in 1979) (decedent treated as owner of stcck held by "any. . . trust with lespect to wbich the 
decedent was treatedas an owner under subpart E, part I, subchapterJ, chaptw I ofthc Code immediately 
prior to his death."). On the validity ofTreasury Regulations generally, see Gans, s u p  note 30, at 733 
(demanshating that in thepast, theIntemal Revenue Sewice hasC'declared victory by its own regulation"). 
37. 1.R.C. 9 672(a). (b). . . , . . .  
38. N Techn8cally 3 "non~dverre p a w "  is definrd a% someone who is not an adverse pan) Id. 
: 6??\b, An "sdvrrsz DL& rs a oerson who has a "substantial beneficial interest" ~n a trusl that would 
. . 
be adversely affected by the exercise or nonexercise of a power with mpect to that trust. Id. 5 672(a). 
Generally speaking, any trust beneficiary will be an adverse party, unless his or her interest is limited to a 
particularportion ofthe trust. Treas. Reg. 8 1.672(a)-I@) (as amended in 1960). Note, however, that an 
income beneficiary of a tmst may not be "adverse" with respect to a power to be exetcised over trust 
pnnc lp~ l  Id. 1672(a)-I(r). A ,ubstantml beneficial imcrzst in a trust is one whose "nlucin relation 
ru the rutal $ 3 1 ~ ~  oithc pro~ezty s~bject o th~. ~ U U C ~ B  "01 insignificanl.~' Id 4 I 672(3)-)(a). 
. . 
39. Forpurposesofestatetax inclusionunder§ 2036(a)(2), aspouseisMrelated" tothetaxpayeronly 
ifliving with the taxpayer. I.R.C. $ 672(c)(l). In contrast, for pulposes of subpart E, part 5 subchapter J, 
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sister;40 any employee of the taxpayer?' any corporation or employee of a 
corporation in which the holdings of a taxpayer (or the particular tmst in 
question) "are significant from the viewpoint of voting control";" and 
"subordinate" employees of a corporation in which the taxpayer is an 
executiveP3 
To illustrate this definition of "related," consider the persons shown in 
Figure A. Assuming that all of them are nonadverse with respect to Dora 
Ewing, those that are "related" toher include her spouse, Roland L u c a ~ ; ~  her 
father, William E ~ i n g ; ' ~  her daughter, Nell L u c a ~ ; ~ ~  her son, William Lucas; 
her granddaughter, Helen Lucas; her grandson, Robert Luca~;"~ and her 
brother, James EwingP8 The persons in Figure A who are not "related" to 
Dora Ewing within the meaning of 6 672(c) are her grandmother, Sarah 
Mannering; her stepson's wife, Abby Gale; her daughter-in-law, Gloe Cox; 
her grandson-in-law, Homer Morrison; Jeremiah Lucas and Ellen Gray, the 
parents ofher husband, Roland Lucas; Alsiness White, the second husband of 
Ellen Gray; her sister-in-law, Mary Mack; her nephew, John Ewing; and her 
nephew's wife, Raymona WeyandP9 
As this example illustrates, an individual's classification as "related" (or 
not) does not obtain merely &om one's blood relationship (sr lack thereof) 
with the taxpayer. Relational status appears to derive in part from generation 
assignment and marital stahls as well. For example, for purposes of 5 672(c) 
and 5 2036(a)(2), Dora Ewing's father, William Ewing, is "related" to her, but 
her grandmother, Sarah Mamering, is not. Dora Ewing's spouse, Roland 
Lucas, is "related" to her for purposes of 672(c) only if the spouses are 
living together:' but Dora Ewing's daughter-in-law, Gloe Cox, and her 
ehaptrr I ofrhoCode (the grantor trust ruler), a grantor tstrcalrd as huld~ng my intzrzst arpo~er  hcld by 
htsor her spouse, unless separated under adecreeof dtvorczor sep*r*lc ~oatntenance Id 6 67?1riO). [?I 
40. i d .  p 672(c)(2).- 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. For purposes of 5 674(c), persons are presumed to be "subservient" to the IaxpayeI unless 
shown not to be subservient by aprepon$-ceof the evidence. Treas. Reg. 5 1.672(c)-1 (as amended in 
1960). 
44. This assumes that Roland tucas is living with his wife, Dora Ewhg. See I.R.C. $672(c)(l); 
see also supra note 39. 
43. LR.C. 8 672(c)(2). 
46. Id. ((grantor's "issue"). 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
SO. Id. 5 672(c)(I). 
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grandson-in-law, Homer Momson, are not "related" to Dora Ewing, regardless 
of whether they cohabitate with their respective spouses (whoare "related" to 
DoraEwing)?' Those blood relatives inthe immediately precedinggeneration 
(e.g., a parent), the same generation (e.g., a sibling) or younger generations 
(e.g., a child or grandchild) may be part of the defined class, but those related 
by marriage, other than a taxpayer's own spouse, are not. 
Note also that the class ofpersons who potentially may be "subordinate" 
extends without regard to blood relationship. Section 672(c) includes in the 
definition of "subordinate" any employee of the grantor-taxpa~er;'~ a
corporation or employee of a corporation "in which the stock holdings of the 
grantor are significant from the viewpoint of voting control";53 and any 
"subordinate employee of a corporation in which the grantor is an 
executi~e.'"~ The actual nature of the grantor-taxpayer's family or 
employment relationships has no bearing on "subordinate" classification for 
purposes of 5 672(c)." Certain family members and business associates are 
presumed to be the alter egos of the taxpayer-grantor, making the class of 
individuals described in F( 672(c) quite broad. 
B. Valuing the Gross Estate-I.R.C. J2032A 's Special Valuation of Real 
Propevty 
1. Generally 
While 5 2036(a) is an estate tax inclusion rule, 2032A is an estate tax 
valuation rule.16 It is an exception to t6e basic principle that the estate tax 
5 I. See id. 8 672(c)(2). 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Notc that for purposes of certain grantor t w t  rules, negative income a x  consequences may 
derive Gom a person's being labeled as "related or subordiiate"on1y whenthat person is also 'Subservient 
to the grantor in respect of the exercise or nonexercise ofthe powers conferred on him unless such pan is 
shown not to be subservient by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. $672(c) (flush language); see id. 
$6 67210 (definitions and rules notto result in toreign ownership), 674 (grantortrealed as owner of any 
pottion of a rmst over which grantor has power to control beneficial enjoyment), 675 (grantor treated as 
owner of any ponion of a t w t  over which grantor has certain administrative powers). 
56. The Joint Canminee on Taxatiou has orwoseda chanae lo the way that mopem is valued for 
. . - . . . .
estatetax purposes. STAFFOF ~OINTCOMM. ON TAXATION, PUBL'NNO JPROVE 
TAXCOMPL~N~EANDREFORMTAXEXPEN~~~~~E~ 3 9 6 (  Specifically, theCommittee has proposed 
that thegift orfftatetaxvalue be determined by referencetothepost-mnsfervalueofthehansferee's entire 
interest in the transfemd asset. Id. at 400. mat  would mean that aminoritv interest discount would not 
beavailableincases where the transferee possesses apostaansferconoollingintnest in hansferredentity. 
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value of a decedent's property is its fair market values7 as of the decedent's 
date of death?' Specifically 5 2032A provides that "qualified real property"" 
- -~ - -- - - - ~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~ 
Id. at 401. Instead of setrinathewealthhansfer taxvalueat "the price at which such property wouldchange 
- 
hands between a willing buyei and a willing seller, neiffier being under compulsion to buy or to sell and 
both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts," Treas. Reg. $8 20.203 I-l(b) (as amended in 19651, 
25.2512-1 (as amended in 1992),the proposal would requirean investigationinto the actual recipient. 
Akey as~ectofthe orow,sedaxpregatian~le i s a i m i t e d f o  o f s p s a l  b u t i o n  STAFF OFJOINT 
. . . . -- - 
COMM. ON TAXATION, ~ u p r a ,  at 404. Under the proposed ~ i e ,  the interestsof spouses are aggregated so 
that,forexmple, stock owned by a transferor's spouse is deemed to be owned by t h e b a n s f a  himselfor 
herself Id. 
A second ~rowosed change is the suggestion of a "look-tbrough" rule to limit the availability of a 
. . - ~ 
dtsrount for lack of marknahtlity. Id at 401. Spcctficnily, the proposal pro\~dcs that in cares w h a t  onr- 
third of chr \due of an ennry's asses srrmarkable, thcn thc wcdth nslrfzr iax value of an) interat 1 3 ,  
(hat entity will be "(1) the &t value of the entity's marketable assets allwable to that transferred interest 
and (2) the value of the hnnsfmor's interest in the entity amibutable to nomarketable assets." Id  In other 
words,no lack of madtetability discount would be available where one-thildof thcentitfs assets are cash, 
bank accounts, money market accounts, commercial paper, bonds, and the like. Id. 
The staffofthe Joint Committee explains hat the aggregation rule and the look-through rule intend 
to %solve valuation conhoversies in a simpler and more adminislrable way." id. at 2. The rule attempts 
to curb "strategic sequmcing of multiple giffs made to the same donee," typically in the %mily conteht. 
Id. at 403. Yet the NIW go beyond that and treat husband and wife as oneentity for wealth transfer tax 
valuation purposes. Such an approach isconsistent with the system proposed in Bridget J. Crawford, One 
Flesh, Two Taxpayers: A New Approach toMarringe and Wealth Tmnsfer Taxation, 6 FLA. TAX. Rsv. 
757 (2004). 
57. Fair marka value is "theprice at which properry would change bands between a willing buyer 
and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or lo sell and both having reasonable 
knowledgeoftherelevant facts." Treas. Reg. 5 20.2031-IF) (1965); see Am. Nat'l Bank &Trust v. United 
States, 594 F.2d 1l41,IlM n.2 (7thCir. 1979) (.qV]alue is apracticd pracess,always changinginaccord 
with the price that it will yield on the market at a given time."). 'While not expressly stated in either the 
Codeorreylations, for purposes of valuing real propertyit is generally accepted that a determining offair 
market value requires mamination of the price the propetty could command in its 'highest and best use."' 
Stahen E. Zumbach et al.. Section 2032ASoecial Use Valuation. 833-2d TAXMGMT. (BNA), at A-1 
. .. 
(2d03). "Highest and best& refers to the 'r&nably probable andlegal use ofvacant land or improved 
property, which is physically possible, while appropriately mpported, finandally feasible, and that result? 
in the hi&est value."' Id. (quoting APPRA~SAL INST., DICTIONARY OF ReAL ESTATE APPRAISAL (4th ed. 
2002)). 
58. I.R.C. $ 2031; T m s .  Reg. 8 20.2031-1@)(1965);sc~alsoRev. Rul. 74-260,1974-1 CB. 275 
(detailing mechanics of application of sixth-month rule). A decedent's executor may elect to have tho 
propnty valued as of the alternate valuation date, which typically is the six-month annivasary of the 
decedent's date of death In order to be elisible to value uroperty as of the allanate valuation date, a 
. .  . 
decedmr's executor must mske the apprnprtate clcction and such<lect!on must decr:Jsr. botli ihr' value of 
the eross csrate and throvcnll etatehx liab~lity. See I RC. 48 2031.1023(~) The Treasuly D~p3nm~nt  
rec&tlyissued final regulations under $2032. s ~ ~ T . D .  9172;2005-6 L R . B . ~ ~ s .  Fora generaldiscussion 
of alternate valuation, see BlnKER ET AL., Supra note 12, at 236-37; STEPHENS ET AL., ~ u p m  note 20, 
14.03; DAVID WESTFALL&GE~RGEP.MAIR,ESTAT~PLANN~GLAW & T A x A T I @ N ~ ~ . O ~  (4thed. 2001). 
Altanatevaluation can be an efictive mpans of post-mortem tax planning. See, e.g., JERRY A. KAsNEn, 
V o s r - h b n r ~ ! d  TAX P I A N U W G  (1991); ~onathan G. ~lattrnachr& ~ r c r i ~ a n n  I Sindc,hiord Thm Lbte 
Hundred Post-Afornm 701 PPlo~nrne Elenionr, 66 N.Y. SI B.1. 26. 31 (1994); Rdben A Dawkinr, 
Another Bite althe Apple: Using rhe~lternote VaIuation Election to Restore a Credit Shelter Tmt, 16 
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may be valued for estate tax purposes at its value for use as a farm for farming 
purposes or its use in a trade or business other than the trade or business of 
farming.'' In almost all cases, a property's value for farming or trade or 
business purposes will be less than the property's fair market value.'' The 
estate tax savings resulting from this alternate valuation may be significant6' 
To be eligible for specialvaluation rules of 5 2032A, an estate must meet 
five threshold req~irements.6~ First, the decedent must have been a citizen or 
resident of the United States at the time ofhis or her Second, the real 
property must be located in the United S ~ t e s . 6 ~  Third, the decedent's 
FROB. &PROP. 28 (2002); Ted D. Englebrwht & Jams M. T~mer,Alfernnte Vnluafion Has Side Efects, 
21 EST. PLAN. 154 (1994). 
59. LR.C. S 2032AhYli. . .  -~~ " . ,~ .
60. Id. § 2032A(a)(I). 
61. Estate of Hankins v. Comm'r, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 229 (1981) (fair market value typically does 
not take into account actual use of property); see also Dennis L Belcher, Esfafe Plonning for Farnib 
Busines.9 Owners: Seetion ZO32A Section 6166 and Section 303, in ESTATE PLANNWG I N  DEPTH 449, 
taxable giffs 
Lea applicable credit amount 
Estate tax due 
~~ ~ 
465-69 (ALI-ABA CLE, courseof ~ ~ l d i e s  MaterialNo. SH092,2003). Priortomaking the electionunder 
2032.4, the executor is not required to show that the real properly had any value other than as a farm or 
in a tradeor business. LRS. Announcement 79-143, 197942 1.RB. 28. 
62. There is a cap of $750,000, adjusted for inflation, on the dec rke  in value under the special 
valuation rules. LR.C. 5 2032A(a)(3). In 2005, the inflation-adjusted amount is $870,000. Rev. Proc. 
2004-71,2004-50 LR.B. 970. 
To illustrate the tax savings that can result from the application of the special valuation rules of 
$2032A, assume unrealistically that a taxpayer dies in 2005 owningonly qualified real property. Assume 
that the property's value for use as a $rm for farming purposes is $9.13 million but its fair market a l u e  
is $10 million. ~ s s b m e  that the decedent had not made any prior taxable gifts and thereforeretained the 
full applicable credit. The estate's tax liability wwld be calculated as follows: 
In 2005, estate fax is imposed at a maximum rate of47%. In 2006, themaximum rate will be 46%. For 
2007,2008 and 2009, the maximum rate will be 45%. tn 2010, there will be no estate tax. lo 201 I, the 
maximm bracket will revert to 55%. I.R.C. 5 2001(c)(Z). 
63. I.R.C. $2032A(a)(l), @). 
64. Id 5 2032A(a)(l)(A). 
65. Id 5 2032A@)(l). 
Wilh 
Application of 
5 2032A 
Taxable estate $9,130,000 
Adjusted taxable gifts 0 
Total 9,130,000 
Taxon taxable estate + adiusted 4,l41,900 
Without 
Application of 
8 2032A 
$10,000,000 
- 0 
10,000,000 
4,550,800 
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executor afErmatively must elect to have 5 2032A apply to the estate. Fourth, 
the executor must file the necessary tax recapture agreementb6 Fifth, the 
property must be "qualified real property."67 The definition of family plays 
an important role in this fiRh requirement. 
"Qualified real property" is defined as real properly that (a) passes from 
the decedent to a "qualified heir";68 (b) was being used, as of the decedent's 
date of death, for a "qualified use" by the decedent or a "member of the 
family" of the decedent;69 and (c) together with other real or personal property 
being so used, comprises a certain percentage of the adjusted value of the 
decedent's gross estate." Each of those requirements will be examined in 
detail. They are multifaceted, complex and intertwin& with the statutory 
definition of family under 5 2032A. 
2. Passing From Decedent to Qualified Heir 
As a threshold matter, to be eligible for the special valuation rules of 
5 2032A, property must be acquired from or pass from the decedent to his or 
her "qualified heir.'"' A qualified heir is defined as a "member of the 
decedent's family."72 For purposes of 5 2032% a taxpayerdecedent's 
"family" consists of (A) any of the taxpayer's ancestors;" (B) the taxpayer's 
spouse;74 (C) any lineal descendant of the ta~payer;~' (D) a lineal descendant 
of the taxpayer's spouse;76 (E) any descendant of the taxpayer's parents (i.e., 
a taxpayer's siblings, nieces and nephews, etc.); and (F) the spouse of any 
lineal descendant of the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse or any descendant of 
66. Id. 5 2032A(a)(lXB), (d)(2). The agremnt provides that tltequalified be11 will be liable for 
an additional tax in the event that the property is disposed of or ceases to be used for its "qualified use" 
withinten years ofthe decedent's death. Id. $2032A(c)(5) (liability for lax). Apmpmy's"qualifieduse" 
is its use as a faun for farming purposes or use in a mde or business other than the bade or business of 
farming. Id. 4 2032A(b)(2). 
67. Id. F) 2032A(a). 
68. Id. $2032A(c)(7)(C) (definition of eligible qualified heir). 
69. Id. $2032A(b)(I). 
70. Id 5 2032A(b)(l)(A), (B). 
71. Id. $2032A@)(1). 
72. Id 5 2032A(e)(2). 
73. Id. 5 2032A(e)(Z)(A). 
74. Id. 8 2032A(e)(Z)(B). 
75. Id, 4 2032A(e)(Z)(C). 
76. Id. 
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the taxpayer's ~arents.7~ To illustrate, consider again the family of 
hypothetical taxpayer Dora Ewing. 
Hypothetical 3. Assume that DoraEwingdevises Blackacre, real property locared inthe 
United States, to any one of the individuals shown in Figure A. 
Members of Dora Ewing's family, as defined by 9 2032A(e)(2), include her 
ancestors (her grandmother, Sarah Mannering; and her father, William 
Ewing);" her spouse (Roland Lucas);" her lineal descendants (her son, 
William Lucas; her daughter, Nell Lueas; her grandson, Robert Lucas and her 
granddaughter, Helen Lucas);sO her stepson, Roger Lucas; the lineal 
descendants of her parents (her parents as well as her brother, James Ewing; 
her nephew, John Ewing):' and the spouses of any lineal descendant of Dora 
Ewing, of Roland Lucas or of her parents (her daughter-in-law, Gloe Cox; her 
grandson-in-law, Homer Morrison; her stepson's wife, Abby Gale; her sister- 
in-law, Mary Mack; and her nephew's wife, Raymona W e ~ a n d ) . ~ ~  In fact, all 
persons shown in Figure A, except for Jeremiah Lucas and Ellen Gray, the 
parents of Roland LucasS3 and Alsiness White, the second spouse of Ellen 
Gray? are "members of the family" of Dora Ewing within the meaning of 
8 2032A." Therefore, when Dora Ewing devises Blackacre to any of the 
individuals shown in Figure A other than Jeremiah Lucas and Ellen Gray, the 
parents of Roland Lucas, or Alsiness White, the second spouse of Ellen Gray, 
the property passes to a "qualified heir" within the meaning of $ 2032AS6 and 
the first requirement of the definition of qualified real property is satisfied. 
3. "Qualified Use" 
In addition to the requirement that property pass to a qualified heir, the 
second prong of the test for "qualified real property" is that on the date of the 
decedent's death, the property is being used for a "qualified use" by the 
77. Id. 5 203ZA(e)(Z)(D). 
78. Id. 5 2032A(e)(2)(A). 
79.  Id. 5 2032A(e)(Z)(B). 
80. Id 5 2032A(e)(Z)(C). William Lucas is a lineal descendant of his mother, Dora Ewing. 
81. Id. 5 2032A(e)(2)(C). James Ewing is a lineal descendant of Dora Ewing's father, William 
Ewing. 
82. Id 9 2032A(e)(2))0. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 5 2032A(e)(2). 
86. Id. § 2032A@)(I), (e)(2). 
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decedent or a member of the decedent's family." A qualified use is "use as 
a fatin for farming purposes" or "use in a trade or business other than the trade 
or business of farming.'"s 
Hvoothetieal4. Assume that fourvears before her death, DoraEwins inheritsGreenacre 
A. 
from her father, William Ewing, dreenacre is real properly locatedln the United States 
that is used in a family-owoed business operated by Dora Ewing. At her death, Dora 
E~ving bequrathsto her daughter, Nell Lucas, her interest .n thc family-owned business. 
Assume tltar Dora Ewine's executor elects to have 6 2032A apply lo the estate and filps 
the necessary recapture agreement. 
In Hypothetical 4, all the relevant criteria appear to be met?' First, Dora 
Ewing is a citizen and resident of the United States.'' Second, Greenacre is 
located in the United States. Third, the facts provide that the executor 
affirmatively elects to have 8 2032A apply to the estate. Fourth, the executor 
files the necessary recapture agreement. Fifth, Greenacre passes to Nell 
Lucas, a qualified heir of Dora Ewing:' and it is used in a trade or business, 
making it "qualified real property." 
4. Percentage Requirements 
In order to be eligible for the special valuation rules of $ 2032A, the 
property not only must be used in a "qualified" way by the decedent or 
members of her "family," but the property also must comprise a certain 
percentage of the decedent's gross estate. Specifically, 50% or more of the 
adjusted value of the decedent's gross estate must consist of the value ofreal 
or personal property which was being used and which was acquired from or 
passes from the decedent to a qualified heir ofthe decedentP2 In other words, 
at least one-half of the adjusted value of the decedent's gross estate must be 
comprised of property eligible for valuation under $ 2032A. 
87. Id. 5 2032A@)(1). 
88. Id. 4 2032Ah)i2). Section 2032A goes on, however, to provide that use merely on the date of 
. . . 
the dccedent'sdrath is not enough. Id g 2U32A(b)(l)(A)-(C) Additional urc tcrtsmusr bc rattr6c.d N 
89 Thiscxamdeassumes, amonzothur facrs,ihat the 50% thresholdof J 2032.4@)(1 1(.411nd rhv 
25% thresholdof 8 2 6 3 2 A ( b ~ 1 ~ ~ )  are b e t  
90. Id. 5 2032A(a)(l)(A). See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
91. I.R.C. 3 2032A(e)(2)(C) (lineal descendants are ''members of the family'? 
92. Id. &2032A(b)(l)(A). The 50% test maybe satisfiedby an aggregate offarmprop- and other 
propatyused inatrade orbusiness. Rev. Rul. 85-168, 1985-2 CB. 197; Estateof@igav. Comm'r,80 
T.C. 484(1983); STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 20,li4.04[31ibl[iil. 
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In addition to the 50% threshold, there is a second percentage test. At 
least 25% of the adjusted value of the gross estate must consist of property 
which, for an aggregate period of five years or more (during the eight-year 
period ending on the decedent's date of (x) was owned by the 
decedent or amember of the decedent's family;94 (y) was used fora "qualified 
use" by the decedent or a member of the decedent's family and (2) with 
respect to which there was "material participation" by the decedent or a 
member of the decedent's family in the operation of the farm or other 
businessY6 In otherwords, the decedent or members of his or her family must 
have played a "material" role in the operation of the b~siness.~' 
93. I.R.C. $2032A@)(l)@). 
94. Id. g 2032A(b)(l)(C)(i). 
95. Id.; see Heffley v. Comm'r, 884 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1989) (in some cicumstauces, cash rental 
is not a qualified use); Schuneman v. United States, 783 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1986) (lease for part of 
production may constitute qualified use). 
96. I.R.C.$2032A@)(l)(C)(ii);seeolsoShermdEstatev. Comm'r,774F.2d 1057(1 IthCir. 1985) 
(passive land rental is not an adive business); Estate ofTruman v. United Scites, 6 CI. Ct. 380 (1984) 
(passive land rental isnot an active business); Estate ofAbeR v. Comm'r,83 T.C. 696 (1984) (same); Estate 
of Holmes v. Comm'r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 839 (1991) (describing test for whet constihlles " ~ g " ) ;  
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 20,14.04[3][b]. 
For purposes of 2032A, matetial participation is defined "in a manner similar to the manner used 
for purposes of paragraph (1) of section 1402(a) (relating to the net earnings from self-employment)." 
I.R.C. 8 2032A(e)(6). Under 5 1402(aX1), material participation has been interpnted to mean actual 
involvement by the owner ofproperty. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. 5 1.1402(a>4(b)(3)(ii)(as amended in 1980) 
(in the context of crop production, "[aln arrangement will be treated as contemplating that the owner or 
tenant will materially participate in the 'production' of the commodities required to be produced by the 
other person under the anmgement ifunder the arrangement it is understood that the hewer or tenant is to 
engage to a materialdegree inthephysical workrelated to theproduction ofsuch commoditia.");see also 
McNamara v. Comm'r, 236 F.3d 410 (8th Cir. 2000) (in farm context, taxpayer's bookkeeping, meal 
preparation, field work, and machinety operation constitute material patticipation in farming business). 
Withrespecttomataialparticipation intheestatetaxcontext,Treas. Reg. 5 20.2032A-3 eqlains that 
"[wlhether the required material participation occurs is afactual determinatioq and the types of activities 
and financial risks which support such a fmding will vary with the modeofownership ofboth the pmperty 
itself and ofany business in which it is used." Treas. Reg. 5 20.2032A-3(a) (as amended in 1981). The 
Regulation gives several examples of activities that will not qualify as material participation, including 
"[plassively collecting rents, salaries, draws, dividends, or ofher income &om the farm or other business 
. . . merely advancing capital and reviewing a cmp plan or otha business proposal and fmancial reports 
each season or business ye=." Id. In the legislative history to the provisions of 5 2057, a provision 
analoeaus to B 2032. the "orincioal factors" in determinine material pwicioation were described as 
- . . - 
'ph)s!cal w o k  andpanirlparlun in mnagemsnt decisions." H.R REP.No.IO~-200, a 399 (1997)(Conf. 
R'p ) (ctatement of nlanagcrs). r.er 0150 Erutc afHrffley v.  Comm'r, 884 F2d 279 (7th Ca. 1989) (coun 
finding that marerial pnlclpaoon natmct,;Msngels 1. L'mtcd Swtes. 828 F 2d 1324 (8thClr 1987)(eoun 
findtneth~t marerial ~an$ciparion tcst was met); Estate aiShenod, 82 T.C. 523 (1984). rev i lon  orher 
grounk, 774 F.2d 1057 (1 ith Cir. 1985). cert. denied, 479 U.S. 814 (1986) (court finding that material 
patticipation test was met). 
97. As with the special valuation rules of 5 2032A, the dedoction rulesof 5 2057 provide forthe 
22 PITTSBURGH TAX REVIEW [Vol. 3:l 
To satisfy the percentage requirements of 4 2032A, the taxpayer himself 
or herself need not be the one using the property. Just as 8 2036(b)(2)'s 
definitionof controlled corporation imputes asset ownership by certain family 
members to a taxpayer, 8 2032A imputes asset we by certain family members 
to a taxpayer. Consider again the family of Dora Ewing shown in Figure A. 
Hypothetkcal 5. Assume the same facts as in Hypothetical 4 above, except that at no 
time does Dora Ewing participate in the operation of the business. Her brother, James 
Ewing, personally operates the business. At her death, Dora Ewing bequeaths to her 
daughter, Net1 Lucas, her interest in the family-owned business. Assume that Dora 
Ewiug's executor elects to have $ 2032A apply to the estate,and files the necessary 
recapture agreement. Greenacre comprises at least 50% of Dora Ewing's gross estate. 
The fact in Hypothetical 5 that DoraEwing herself never participates in any 
way in the operation of the business does not preclude the application of 
8 2032A to her estateP8 As before, all the relevant criteria appear to be met. 
First, Dora Ewing is a citizen and resident of the United States.g9 Second, 
Greenacre is located in the United States. Third, the facts provide that the 
executor affmtively elects to have 8 2032A apply to the estate. Fourth, the 
facts provide that the executor files the necessary recapture agreement. Fifth, 
Greenacre is "qualified real property" because it passes to Nell Lucas, a 
qualified heir of Dora Ewing,loo and it is used in a trade or business. The 
participation of James Lucas in the family business redounds to the benefit of 
Dora Ewing's estate, making the property eligible for the special valuation 
annbut~on to the dccedrnl ofowaenhtp and use of the prupeny by members of h>s or her famlly Under 
6 2057, aocstatetax deducnonofup zo%675,000 is a\atlable vtth respecttoany 'qwltfied iarmly-ounhl 
business 1nlerest"oumcd by a &cnt I.R.C. 8 2057(a)(l I .  Because this rule applies only vilth respccr 
todecedents dying befwe January 1,2004, hwe,er ,  it isnot discussed in detail here For funha analpis 
of the dcductiun under 8 2057, see, for example. Manin A.Cialdberg 4 Roben E. Wnek,Esrole Pbnning 
lor the Future Reinstolemenr of1.R.C. J2057, 18 QLIINNIPIAL' PROB. L.J. 128 (2004). D ~ m s  I. Belchn. 
Plannine far the Section ZOS7Familv-Owned Businm Deduction, in ESTATE PLANNHG IN DEPTH 403 
- *  
(,\U-ABACl.E,CourseofS~udies hlatenal No. SH092.2003); Shannon E.  O'Brien,Ertote Tax Treorearn!mr 
o f  FomiAwOwnrd Bunnesses: The E~vlur;on ~[Fo'antilv-Owned Bur,nesrr: l 3 e  Etolutcon oflnten8al 
k v e n u k ~ o d e  Section 2057,67 UMKC L. REG. 495 (j999). Note that who qualifies as a member of a 
particular family is a key threshold determination in the applicability of 8 2057. See Rev. Rul. 81-236, 
1981-2 C.B. 172 (impaaofdivoreeon b i l y  relationships). Section 2057(i)(2)incorporates byrofemce 
the definition of family used in $2032A(e)(2). 
98. This example assumw, among other Escts, that the 50% threshold of $2032A@)(I)(A) and the 
25% threshold of $ 2032A(b)(lXB) are met 
99. I.R.C. 8 2032A(a)(l)(A); see supm note 64 and accompanyingtext. 
100. I.R.C. 8 2032A(e)(2)(C) (lineal descendants are "members of the family"). 
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rule of 5 2032A, because it comprises the requisite percentage of the adjusted 
value of Dora Ewing's gross estate."" 
The estate tax law takes an expansive view of family-owned businesses 
by according benefits to taxpayers who themselves may not be actively 
involved in running the business, as long as members of their family are. By 
allowing the attribution of the activities (and ownership) of family members 
to a taxpayer, the law recognizes that family-owned businesses are different 
from other assets. Therefore, the definition of a decedent's "family" plays a 
critical role in the interpretation and application of $ 2032A.102 
C. Payment of Taxes-1.R.C. $6166'~ Extension of T h e  for ~ a h e f l t  of 
Estate Taxes 
I. Generally 
The identity and activities of a taxpayer's family bear on not only what 
assets are included in a decedent's gross estate''' and how they are valued,lo4 
but also when the calculated taxes must be paid. The general rule is that the 
executor must pay estate tax within nine months of the decedent's date of 
death.lo5 In certain limited instances, however, an executor may elect to pay 
the estate tax liability in as many as ten annual installments.lo6 This 
101. I.R.C. S 2032A(bUlYA): see supra notes 92-96 and amm~anving tekt. 
. . . . , . . . . -  
102. Section 2057 is another Code section in which the defmition of family plays an impomt role. 
Section 2057 allows an estate tax deduction for certain interests in qualified familv owned busineses, but 
is repeated for decedents dying after 2003 and before 2011. I.RC. $ 2057i). Unda the "sunsef' 
provisions of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Recmciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,. 
$ 901(a)(l), 115 Stat. 38, 150 [hereinafIer EGTRRA], the deduction is scheduled to be applicable to 
decedents dvios in 2011 and after. Section 2057 incornorates by refemce 6 2032A's definition of 
qualified heir RC $9 2057(b)(2)(B). 2032A(e)(9) ~ b r  thcrc reasons, thls An~cle does not address 
d 2057 in detall Note, however. that estatcr that sualtfv for the speclal \alultlon mlcr of 6 2032A often 
ieek to qualify also for the deduction under $ i057.- See generally ROBERT M. B E L L ~ I ,  ESTATE 
PLANNING FOR FARMS ANDOTHER QUALWIED FAMILY OWNED BUSrNESSES (1998). Par a discussion of 
planning opportunities for $ 2057 in 201 1 and after, see Goldberg & Wnek, supra note 97. 
103. Seegenerally supra Part IA.l, 2. 
104. See generally supra Part 18. 
105. Section 2001(a) imposes a tax on the trmsferof the taxable estate ofeveq citizenor rcsident 
of the United States. 1.R.C. $2001. Under $ 6075(a), the due date is the nine month anniversary of the 
decedent's death, unless the Servioe has granted an extension of time to file. See also id. 5 6151(a) 
f'DK]hen a rehun of tax is required . . .the p e r m  requiled to make suchrehrm shall, without assessment 
or noticeand demand fromthe Secretary, pay such tax tothe internal mvenue officer with whom therehun 
is filed, and shall pay such tax at the time and place fixed for filing the rehun . . . ."I; Treas. Reg. 
$20.6075-1 (as amended in 2001) (same). 
106. Sccz 1.RC. $ 6166(a)(l)-(3). Fora deseriptioa of lheoverlap between the 10-year extension of 
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installment option is available under 9 61 66 to those estates in which the value 
of an "interest in a closely held business" that is included in the decedent's 
gross estate exceeds 35% of the adjusted gross estate.Io7 At first reading, this 
rule seems to be purely arithmetic. However, whether a particular interest is 
one in a "closely held business" for 5 6166 purposes is a complex 
determination that again depends on the definition of family. Perhaps not 
surprisingly at this point in the analysis, 4 6166's definition is different from 
each of the previous definitions used in $2036(a) and r) 2032A.10s 
For purposes of $ 6166, an "interest" in a closely held business is a 
proprietorship interest, a partnership interest or stock in a corporation,lo9 as 
long as the proprietorship, partnership or corporation is carrying on a trade or 
business."' A partnership or corporation is "closely held" for purposes of 
8 6166 if either (a) the decedent's gross estate includes 20% or more of the 
partnership's total capital interests (in the case of a partnership interest)"' or 
the value of the voting stockof the corporation (in the case of ~ tock)"~  or (b) 
the partnership or corporation has 45 or fewer partners or shareholders.'13 To 
illustrate, consider another hypothetical. 
Hypothetical 6. Assume that DoraEwing dies with a gross estate valued for estate tax 
purposes at $10,000,000."4 Further assume that the only assets of her estate are 
time to pay under 5 6166(a)(l) and the 5-yewdefenal period under 5 6166(a)(3), see supro note 13. 
107. LR.C. 5 6166(a)(l j. 
108. Id. d. 6616(bj(l)(A)-(C). 
109. Id. 
110. Id. $6166(b)(I)(Aj. Presmably passim investing as a proprietorship would not qualie as a 
tradeorbusiness. See Rev. Rut. 61-55,1961-1 C.B. 713 (ownenhip ofoil andgas royalty intacstsalone 
is not a hade or business for purposo of 1R.C. 5 6166): see also Rev. Rul. 75-365, 1975-2 CB. 471 ("5 6166 was intended to apply only with regard to a business such as a manufacturjng, mercantile, or 
service enterprise, as distinguished from management of investment assets."); Rev. Rul. 75-367, 1975-2 
C.B. 472 ("[LR.C. $ 61661 was not intended to pmtect continued management of income prcducing 
properties . . . except where they formed a part of an active enterprise producing business income rather 
than income solely fromthe ownership ofproperty."); 1.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 8448-006(Aug. 20,1984) 
p a  qualify for d. 6166 treatmeat, intaest 'bust bean interest in an active trade or business. The level of 
activity is the factor that distinguishes an 'active business' from me mere passive ownership of income 
producing assets."). See generally Jonathan E. Gopman & Paul B. McCawley,Estote Tax Paymenband 
Liabilities, 832 TAX MGMT. (BNA), at A-7 n.60 (2003) (on active business vs, investment purposes). 
I1 I. I.R.C. $ 6166(b)(l)(B)(i). 
112. Id. 5 6166(b)(l)(C)(i). 
113. Id. $ 6166(b)(l)(B)(ii), (C)(i). 
114. Propaty is valued for estate tax purposes at its fair market value as of the decedent'sdate of 
. ~ . . 
Ilcath,or~s ufthealtemau wluauundale, ~fapplicable. Trras Kc@ 4 20.2031-lib, (a? lmcndud in 1965). 
Therulcr appltcable to the selecl~un afthe alternate valuarlon dare have brcn changed by fmai regulations 
~ssucd on Januvy 4,2005. See T.D. 9172,2005-6 1 R.B. $68 (arnmdmg TTCBS. Reg $30.2032- I(b),. 'Ihr 
rcgularions provide that altrmace \duation is avallableoniy i f~uch an elecuun uiil decrease bulh the 9122 
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$6,000,000 in cash and $4,000,000 of stock of Company Y, and that at the time of her 
death, Dora Ewing owned 100% of Company Y's outstanding stock. 
In order to qualify for the extension of time to pay estate taxunder 9 6166(a), 
Dora Ewing's executor must make three showings: first that Dora Ewing 
owned an "interest" in Company Y;Il5 second that Company Y is "closely 
held" with respect to her;"6 and third that the value of Dora Ewing's interest 
in Company Y exceeds 35% of the adjusted gross estate."' All showings are 
made here. Dora Ewing owned Company Y stock, and stock is a business 
''. 
~nteres t . "~~~ Second, Company Y is "closely held" because Dora Ewiug 
owned more than 20% of Company Y's voting stock (in fact, she owned 
loo%), and because Company Y had 45 or fewer shareholders (in fact, Dora 
Ewing was the sole ~hareholder)."~ Third, the value ofDora Ewing's interest 
in Company Y ($4,000,000) exceeds 35% of her gross estate (in this case it is 
40% of her entire gross estate).lZ0 Dora Ewing's estate therefore should be 
eligible for the extension of time for payment of estate taxunder 5 6166(a).I2' 
2. Attribution ~ u l e s  
In contrast to the facts of Hypothetical 6 above, consider a scenario in 
wbich Dora Ewing's individual ownership does not rise to the requisite level. 
Her estate nevertheless may be able to qualify for the extension of time to pay 
estate taxes through possible application ofany one of three rules that attribute 
others' ownership interests to Dora Ewing. First, stock or partnership 
interests held jointly'22 or as community property with a survivingspouse will 
ofthe gross stateand the sum of the esLlte andgenerationskipping transfer tax liability payable by reason 
ofproperty includible in the decedent's gross estate. Treas. Reg. 5 20.2032-1(b) (as amended in 1965). 
115. I.R.C. 5 6166(a)(1). 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 5 6166@)(1)(A)-(C). 
119. Id. 5 6166(b)(l)(C). It wouldbesufficient forU1ee~ecutortosati~~eitherthe~otingpei~entage 
or ihe shareholder test in order for Company Y to qualify as a closely held business with respat to the 
decedent. 
120. The moss estate is $10,000,000-$6,000.OM) in cash and $4,000,000 in Company Y stock. 
121. I.R.C. 5 6166(a)(1). 
122. For purposes of 5 6166(b)(Z)(B)(ii), joint ownership includes joint tenancy, tenancy by the 
entirety, or tenancy in common. Generally speaking joint tenancy is Tenancy with two or more coowners 
who take identical intewts simultaneouslyby thesame instrument and with the same riglit ofpossession." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1505 (7th ed. 1999). Tenancy by the entirety typically is "a form ofjoint 
tenancv. It msembles ioint tenancy in that won the death of either husband or wife the survivor 
automahically acquires title to the share of the deceased spouse. Like a joint tenancy, also, it is necessary 
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be treated as owned by a single ta~payer."~ Second, a shareholder, partner or 
beneficiary of a trust is deemed to own proportionately any property owned 
directly or indirectly by or for any corporation, partnership or t r u ~ t . ~ ~ W i r d ,  
a decedent is deemed to own all partnership interests and stock owned by any 
"member" of his or her "family," as defined in 8 267(c)(4)."' In other words, 
a decedent is deemed to own all partnership interests and stock owned by his 
or her siblings,lz6 spouse, ancestors and lineal  descendant^!^' As a practical 
matter, these three attribution rules mean that for purposes ofthe limitation on 
the number ofpartners or shareholders of a closely held business, the decedent 
and members of his or her family are treated as one @xpayer.'" 
To illustrate the application of the attribution rules, consider the 
following hypothetical. 
Hypothetical 7. Assutlnt the same facts as in Hypothetical 6 above, except that Dora 
Ewing is one of 50 shmeholdns of Company Y. Each shareholder, including Dom 
for the creation of a tenancy by the entireties that the husband and wife acquire title by the same deed or 
will." Id. at 1506 (quoting ROBERT KRATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW 198 (6th ed. 1974)). Finally, tenancy 
in common is "tenancy by hvo armore persons, in equal or unequal undivided shares, each pason having 
an equal right to possess the &ole prop* but oo right of swivowhip." Id. 
123. I.R.C. 5 6166@)(2)@)(i), (ii). 
124. Id. 5 6166@)(2)(C). For purposes of 5 6166(b)(Z)(C), aperson is a"beneficiary"ofarmstonly 
to the extent that such person has a "present interest" in the trust. Presumably a "present interest" would 
be intemreted to mean a present right to receive income ar principal from the mst. Cf: id. 2503(b) 
~ ~ 
(nansfersofprermt intcrestr mayqualify for rhcgifi lax annualcxc1usion);Trcas. RQ. 9 25.2503-3(b)(as 
amendd in 1983) ('An unrestricted right tathe immcdisteuse, pmsersian, orenjoyment ofpropmy or the 
income from propmy (such as a lifeestate or term certain) is a present interest in pmp&>). In the 
generation-skipping transfer tzx contexc a person has an 'Interst" in a tnrst if he or she (i) has a present 
right to receive trust income or principal; (ii) is a permissible current recipient ofhust principal or income 
and is not described in section 2055(a) (a transfer for public, charitable or religious use); or (iii) a transfer 
for public, charitable or religious use if the trust is a charitable remainder annuity mst, a charitable 
remainderunitrustora pooled income fund Treas. Reg. 5 26.2612-1(e)(1) (asamended in200S);cI :T~~~.  
CODE ANN. 5 67-8-101 (2004) ("Where a donor transfers an unqualified andunrestricted gift to a penon 
in trust, such transfer is a gift of a present interest where the hllSt i n s m e n t  provides that the beneficiary 
has the powa to demand immediate possession and enjoyment of such gift in the calendar year in which 
it is given."); Wts. STAT. 5 700.03 (2004) ("Interests in property are classified as to the time ofenjoyment 
as: (1) [a] plesent interest, which entlles the owner to thepresmt possession or enjoyment of the benefits 
of properly; or (2) [a] future interest, which does not entitle the owner to possession or enjoyment of the 
benefits of properly until a future time.'? 
125. I.R.C. 5 6166@)(2)@). 
126. To qualify as a"sibEngV ofa taxpayer, such person need have only one parent in common with 
the taxpayer. In other words, it is irrelevant whether the sibling is "by the whole or half blood." Id. 
5 267(c)(4). 
127. Id. The ancestors or siblings of a taxpayer's spouse are not included within the definition of 
family for purposes of 5 267(c)(4). 
128. Id. 5 6166(b)(Z)(B)-(D). 
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Ewing owns 1.000 shares valued at $4,000 per share ($4,000,000 in a ~ m a t e ) ! ~ ~  The 
-- - 
corpo~ation has no other votingstock andali stock has the same voting rights. Ofthe49 
shareholders other than Dora Ewing, one is her father, William Ewing; one is her 
busbend, Roland Lucas; one is her brother, lames Ewing; one is herson, William Lucas; 
and one is her daughter. Nell Lucas. The other 44 shareholders are not related to Dora 
Ewing in miy way: 
On the question of whether Company Y is a closely held corporation with 
respect to Dora Ewing, she herself owns only two percent (or 1,000 out of 
50,000) of the corporation's voting shares,"' making Company Y not closely 
held on that basis alone."' Nevertheless Dora Ewing's interest in Company 
Y may qualify as an "interest in a closely held business" if Comp'any Y has 45 
or fewer  shareholder^.'^' At first glance, this seems impossible because 
Hypothetical 7 states that Company Y had 50 shareholders. Recall however, 
that under F) 6166@)(2)@), stock held by a decedent-taxpayer "or by any 
member of his family within the meaning of section 267(c)(4)) shall be treated 
as owned by the decedent.""> A taxpayer's "family" is defined in F) 267(c)(4) 
as siblings, spouse, ancestors and lineal  descendant^."^ Thus Dora Ewing is 
deemed to own the shares held by her brother, James Ewing; her husband, 
Roland Lucas; her father, William Ewing, her son, William Lucas; and her 
daughter, Nell Lucas, all of whom are members of her family for purposes of 
8 6166."' Through the application of these attribution rules, Company Y is 
deemed to have 45 total shareholders (i.e., Dora Ewing and the 44 individuals 
who are not related to her in any way). Company Y therefore is aclosely held 
. - .  
business with respect to Dora ~ w i i ~  - withim the meaning of 
129. Forpurposes ofthisillustration, assume that no valuationdiscountsareapplicable tothe shares 
owned bv Dora Ewinp, or a v  other shareholder of Company Y. For a general discussion of valuation 
. .
dtscounts in the estate tax c~ntcxt, see 15 JACOB MERTENS LAW OF FEDFRAL IKCOME TAXATION 9 59:14 
~Chriaina F. McCann ed., 2005) (vatuat~on for fedcral estatetax purposco): Wendy C. Grrog. Acluoriol 
. . . . 
Toblrr VersusFocrually BaredErtnte Tox Voluorion. Ilhoco Trust Revistled, 38REn~ PnoPPRoa.&Tn. 
1. 742 (LUW); lashua S. Rubenstein. Valuol;on. Taration & Plmn;nz Te~.hn;purr for Soph~s[;cmed 
. ~ 
Estores: R ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ D ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ ~ V A L ~ A ~ ~ N , T ~ ~ A ~ ~ ~ N & P L ~ N ~ N G T E C H N ~ Q U E ~ F O R S O P H I S T ~ C A T E D  
ESTATES 2003. at 7 (PLI Tax Law & Est. Plan. Practice Course, Handbook Smer No. 322,2003). 
130. The shares would most likely be included in Dora Ewiag's estate under 5 2033 (pmpexty in 
which the decedent had an interest). The attribution mles of 8 6166(b)(2) apply only for purposes of the 
dclinilion ofa closely held business interest, not to estate tax inclusion itself. I.R.C. 8 6166(bJ(2) 
131. See id 5 6166(bj(I)(C)(i) (decedent's stock ownership of a caporation will bea closely held 
. . .  . . . 
business interest forpurpose of $6166(a)(1) ifdecedent's gross&tate includes twenty percent or more of 
the value of the voting stock of the corporation). 
132. Id. $ 6166(b)(l)(,C)(ii). 
133. Id 6166(b)(2)(D). 
134. Id. 5 267(c)(4). 
135. Id. 9 6166@)(2)(D). 
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5 6166(b)(1)(C)(ii).'36 That fact, combined with the fact that the value of her 
interest in Company Y exceeds 35% percent of her gross estate, means that 
Dora Ewing's estate will be eligible for the deferred payment provisions of 
§ 6166.13~ 
D. A Spectrum of Definitions 
Each of the Code sections described in this Part defines "family" (or 
"related" persons) differently. Putting aside the potential inclusion of 
corporations and employees in the definition of "related or subordinate" 
parties under 3 6 7 2 ( ~ ) , ' ~ ~  made applicable to 5 2036@)(2), the Code sections 
could be arranged on a definitional spectrum with restrictive and expansive 
definitions at opposite ends. At the restrictive end of the spectrum would be 
2036's inclusion rule for retained interests in "controlled  corporation^."'^^ 
136. Id. 5 6616@)(1)(C)(ii). 
137. Id. 5 661qa). Presumably the athibution rules can apply alone or in combination. Consider, 
for example, another hypothetical: 
Hypothetical7%. Assume the same facts as in Hypothetical 7, above, exceptthat instead of five 
ofDora Ewing's family members holding shares ofcompany Y, each ofthese Gmily members was 
the sole owner of a corporation that in turn owned 1,000 shares of Company Y stack. 
In this example, Company Y again is not a '%lasely held bwiness" interest with respect to Dora Ewing 
under the percentage ownership test because only hvo pacent(or 1,000 out of 50,000) of the corporation's 
voting shares is includd in Dora Ewing's gross estate. See id. 5 6166(b)(l)(C)(I) (decedent's stock 
owneshipofacorpomtion willbeaclosely held businessinterestforpurposesof 5 6166(a)(l) ifdecedent's 
grossestate includes twenty parentor more ofthe valueofthevotingstockofthecorporation). Theshares 
would most likely be included in Dora Ewing's estate under 8 2033 (property in which the decedent had 
an interest). Theathibution rules of 5 6166(b)(2) apply only for purposes ofthe definition ofa closely held 
business interest, not to estate tax inclusion itself. See id. 5 6166(b)(2). Unda the shareholder test, 
however, Company Y will constimte a controlled corporation with respect to Dora Ewing by virtue of a 
double application of the attribution rules See id. 5 6166@)(1)(C)(ii), @)(2)@). 
To explain, 5 6166(b)(Z)(C) provides that a corporation's holdings will be deemed to be owned 
prop onion ate^ by its shareholden. Id. 6166@)(2)(C). Hypothetical 7% provides that each of W~lliam 
Ewing, RolandLucas, Jams  Ewing, WilliamLucas, and Nell Lucas is the sole shareholder of a company 
that owns 1.000 sharesofComvanvY stock. Forvumoses of 6 6166,then. eachofthoseversons isdeemed 
toown i,oooshares directly. id. 66166(b)(z)(cj. Furthemire, indetermining whethkr CompanyY has 
45 or fewer shareholden. Dora Ewine will be demed to own the shares of Comvanv Y that her father. 
- . . 
spouse, brother, and ch~ldrrn own. See rd. Q 6166(b)(2)(0). Thus, as before. Cumpan) Y will bzdcemed 
to have 45 total shareholders (i.e.. Dora Ewine and the44 indxviduals uba are not relat:d to her in any 
way). Company Y meets the definition-of a closely held business within the meaning of 
5 6166@)(I)(C)(ii), and because the value of Dora Ewing's interest in Company Y exceeds 35% of her 
gross estate, her estate should be eligible for the defmed payment provisions of 5 6166. Id. 5 6166(a). 
138. Id 5 672(c)(2);see supra notes42-43. 
139. Under 5 2036(a)(1), the value of a decedent's gross estate includes the value o f  allproperty to 
the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer . . . by trust or 
otherwise, under which he has retained.. .the possession or enjoyment of, orfhe rigbt to the income fmm, 
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Section 2036(b)(2)'s reference to 5 3 18 attributes to a taxpayer the ownership 
of his or her spouse, children, grandchildren andparents.""t the broad end 
of the spectrum (again, ignoring corporations and employees) would be 
$ 2032A and its vision of family as including stepchildren and various 
relations by marriage.'4' Somewhere in between would be $ 6166'42 and 
$ 2036(a)(2),143 identical in all important respects except for the latter's 
inclusion of certain corporations and family members in the definition of 
family. 
The $ 2036(a)(2) rule, read together with $ 672(c), is unique in that it 
moves the definition of "related" persons beyond family relationships defined 
by blood or mamage. In that sense, it seems to be a broad-reaching and 
comprehensive definition of family, although notably stepchildren and step- 
grandchildren, nieces and nephews and spouses of childrenta4 are not 
otherwise members of the family, absent an additional employment 
relation~hip.'~' The reasons for the differences in the definitions of "family" 
and "related" persons will be explored in Part 11. 
The Code sections described in Part I were adopted at different times and 
for different purposes. Section 2036, for example, is a rule of estate tax 
inclusion that applies when a decedent maintains too much control over 
transferred property.'46 Section 2032A, in contrast, is concerned with the 
valuation of property that is already included in the gross estate and aims to 
reduce estate tax so that a farm or other business will be more likely to stay 
the property." LR.C. 5 2036(a)(l); seesupra note 18 and accompanying text. 
140. I.R.C. 4 3 18(aX1); see also supra notes 25-28 and accompanying toxt. 
141. Undrr 5 2032.\,cenin real propmy may be valued fa estate tax purposes nt its value for usz 
as a farm for farmmg purpose or irs usc m a trade or busine,, other than the trade or business of famnng 
I.R.C. 5 2032~(a)(l);~se~supru Part LB.1 and accompanying text. 
142. Under 6166, an executor may elect to pay estate tax liability in installments. I.RC. 
5 6166(ax1)-(3); see supra Pat LC. I. 
143. Section 2036(a)(2) includes in a decedent's gross estate the value of aU propem to the extent 
that thedecedentretains thorighttodesignatethepmsonswha benefit from thetransferred property. I.RC. 
g 2036(axZ); see supra Part LA.2. 
144, Cf: LRC. 2036(a)(Z)(stepchildren and step-grandchild~ti, nieces and nephews and spouses 
of children are not defined as members of the family). 
145. The differences among the relevant Code sections are sammarized in the Appendix. 
146. See infro Pan 1I.A. 
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in a fa mil^.'^' Finally 9 6166 applies after the value of a gross estate has been 
determined, and provides certain taxpayers with an extension of time to pay 
estate taxe~."~ In enacting (andrevising) each of these pmvisions separately 
over a period of several years, it does not appear that lawmakers took the 
extant sections into account. For that reason, no one definition of family 
applies universally for all estate tax purposes. 
A. Estate Tar inclusion: Z.R.C. 8 2036 
The 1976 enactment of 9 2036(b)L49 seems to have been adirect response 
to strategic activityby taxpayers, and in particular, estate planning techniques 
that were touted as "the 'ultimate' in estate planning."is0 These techniques 
typically were straight-forward transfers of shares to a trust, for example, 
without relinquishment of voting rights, which some contemporary 
commentators suggested rendered the transfer eligibIe for a gift tax valuation 
discount (for the retained voting right) without being later subject to estate 
taxation (because the transferor no longer owned the shares)."' In fact, 
5 2036(b) frequently is called the "anti-Bymm" pro~ision,"~ after the 1972 
case in which the government unsuccessfully asserted estate tax inclusion 
caused by a taxpayer's retention of voting rights with respect to shares 
transferred to a trust.ls3 In enacting 5 2036(b), lawmakers took the view that 
voting rights were the essence of stock ownership and explained that, 
"[vloting rights are so significant with respect to corporate stock that the 
~~ ~~ ~ ~ 
147. See infro Pan U.B. 
148. See i n !  Pan H.C. 
149. Tax Reform Act of 1976,Pub. L. No. 94455.90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of the 1.RC.). 
150. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1 380, at 799 n.3 (1976). The House Report referred to published articles 
dcscniingaggressive estafeplanningtechniques: "Onecommentator bas mmsted that '[t]he'kltimate" 
in estate planning for most controlling stockholders of closely held corporations is the avoidance of a 
Federalestate tax oncorporatevotingshares thatthey bavemnsfer@ toarmst inwhich they have resewed 
the uninterrupted right to continue voting tbe shares."' Id. (quoting Stanley Pressment, Effect of Tar 
C0411'kGilman his ion on &totePlaming for {he Close Corporation, 44 J. TAX'N 160 (1976)). 
151. Id. ("[Mr. Pre~sment] further suggests that the value of the gift might be reduced by the value 
amibutable to theretained voting rights, lfthis is dme, thevalueamihulcd to voiingrightawould not be 
subject either to gifl t a x  at the time of the gift or .  . .the estate tax upon the death of the donor."). 
152. STEPHENS ETAL., supra note 20,7 4.08[61[d]. 
153. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972). For ageneral discussion of the Byrum case, see 
Mitchell M. Gans & Jonathan G. Btamnachr, Smngi: A Critical Anolyds ondPlo,nningSuggesfions, 100 
TAX NOTES 1153, 1154, 1156-59 (2003); Brant I..Hellwig, Revisithg Bymm, 23 VA. TAX REV. 275 
(2003); lensen,supra note 19, at 221 n.156. 
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retention of voting rights by a donor should be treated as the retention of the 
enjoyment of the stock for estate tax  purpose^."'^^ 
Notwithstanding legislators' clear views on the property-like nature of 
voting rights, the adopted aggregation rules of 9 2036(b) (made applicable to 
the estate tax inclusion rule of 9 2036(a)(l)) do not necessarily accomplish 
legislative intent. It is not clear fromthe legislative history, for example, why 
Congress chose one set of attribution rules over another for purposes of 
5 2036@).'55 There is no intuitive reason that an individual's stockownership 
should be aggregated with that of his or her spouse, children, grandchildren 
and parents, for example, but not with other family members. Indeed 
9 2036@)(2)'s attribution rule is internally inconsistent insofar i s  Taxpayer 
1's ownership is aggregated with the ownership of his or her grandchild, 
Taxpayer 2, for purposes of a transfer by Taxpayer 1, but the rule does not 
apply in reverse. For purposes of a transfer by Taxpayer 2, his or her 
ownership is not aggregated with that of Taxpayer 1, the grandparent. If 
voting rights truly were the quintessence of property ownership, one would 
expect to see a bilaterally applicable rule. But 8 2036(b)(2) is concerned not 
just with ownership but also with control. The unilateral attribution of 
Taxpayer 1's stock ownership with Taxpayer 2's is based on the presumption 
that a grandparent controls his or her grandchild, but that the grandchild does 
not control the presumably wealthier and more powerful grandparent. 
Unlike the inclusion rule of 9 2036@) which was enacted by statute, the 
inclusion rule of 8 2036(a)(2) is the product of revenue rulings and court 
 decision^."^ Indeed 8 2036(a)(2) itself containsno prohibition on the removal 
of certain trustees by a taxpayer-t~ansferor.'~' Furthmnore, while the estate 
tax inclusion rule is rooted in concerns about a grantor attempting to evade 
taxation on assets he or she still controls, it is not obvious why the class of 
trustees who may be appointed in a removed trustee's place should be defined 
by reference to the income tax provisions of 8 672(~)."~ The Service just as 
easily could have defined the prohibited class by reference to another estate 
tax provision. Although the Service's ruling lacks direct legislative authority, 
154. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1380, at 65 (1976). 
155. See I.R.C. 8 318(a)(l)(A). 
. . .  . . 
156. See Rev. Rul. 95-58, 1995-2 C B .  191; see also supra note 36 (discussing Estate of Wall and 
Emte  $Yak). 
157. See 1.R.C. 8 2036(a)(2). 
158. See Rev. Rul. 95-58, 1995-2 C.B. 191. 
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any interpreting court should give significant deference to the Treasury 
Department's revenue ruling. Is9 
B. Estate Tax Valuation: I.R.C. f 2032A 
Unlike 5 2036(a)(1) and (2), which are estate tax inclusion rules, 5 2032A 
is a valuation provision that is designed to benefit farmers and small business 
owners. In enacting 9 2032A in 1976, legislators singled out these 
constituents for the favorable valuation rules on the ground that they were 
engaged in particularly desirable activities: "[IJt is inappropriate to value land 
on the basis of its potential 'highest and best use" especially since it is 
desirable to encourage the continued use of the property for farming and other 
small business  purpose^."'^" interpreting Ej 2032A, the Tax Court has 
identified the legislative intent as concern with estate tax liquidity, explaining 
that "[tlhe purpose of the special valuation provision is to lessen the estate tax 
burden and to alleviate the liquidity problems faced by the surviving family 
of a person who dies owning real property used as a farm or in a closely held 
business. The provision is intended to allow the family to continue operating 
the farm or other business, rather than being forced to sell the land to pay 
estate ta~es."'~' 
The definition of family in 5 2032 has not been static since its enactment. 
As part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, the provisions of 
159. See Gans, supra note 36, at 777-79 (indicating that the Supreme Court "likely will eventually 
clarify that Skidmare is the appropriate framework for analyzing the validity of rulings:' where Skidmore 
stands for the proposition that courts will defer to revenue rulings by the Internal Revenue Service where 
the agency has undertaken a thorough decision-making process, maintained its position cansistently, a d  
employed valid reasoning). 
160. H . R . R E ~ . N o . 9 4 - 1 3 8 0 . a t 2 1 - 2 2 ( 1 9 7 6 1 : s e e o l s o  
. .. 
No. JCS-33-~~,GENERALEXPLANATLONOFTHETAXREFORMACTOF 1976,at 537 (1976) (Taluationon 
the basis of hiehet and best use. rather than on amtal use. mav result in the im~osition of subs fan ti all^ 
- 
hjghei estatc tzxer. In some cases, the greater elute Ux burden makes conunuation of famine or the 
closely held busincssactivilies.not fastblc bccauscthe income pownttal fromthesesctivines istnsuOicir.nt 
to rew~ce cxtmdsd uxpaymenls or loans obtatned to pay thc tax."). 
161. Stovslv Comm'r. I01 T C  110, 14b(1993), rcealroZumbsch ct al.,rupru note 57, at A.1 (the 
special valuation rules "benefitheirs*, while desirikto continnetheoperation~fafmor~losely held 
business, could otherwise be required to sell such property to pay estate taxes"). In enacting a related 
. . .~ 
provkio", the deduction for quaiified family owned business interests under $2057, the Senate Finance 
Committee explained that "a reduction in estate taxes for qualified family-owned businesses will protect 
and preserve hmily f a m  and otha family-owned enterprises, and prevent the liquidation of such 
enterprises in order to pay estate taxes. The Committee further believes that the protection of family 
enterprises will preserve jobs and sbe~pthen the communities in which such enterprises are located." S. 
REP. No. 10533, at 40 (1997). 
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liq~idity.'~' The ambiguities in 5 2032A's definition of family, then, may be 
of practical import to a relatively small number of taxpayers. 
C. Estate Tax Payment: I.R.C. f 6166 
In 1958, Congress first enacted the extension of time to pay estate taxes 
under $ 6166 to provide some relief to estates substantially comprised of 
closely held business intere~ts . '~~ The purpose of this legislation, according 
to contemporary statements on the Senate floor, was "to prevent the break up 
of small businesses once they are established and to prevent their 
consolidation into larger businesses. [The ten-year extension of time to pay 
taxes] should make it unnecessary to sell a decedent's business in order to 
finance his estate."17' Tax relief was viewed as a fulfillment of a bipartisan 
agreement "to study and solve the handicaps of new and small b~siness.""~ 
By placing less tax burden on owners of small businesses, lawmakers 
reasoned, the new law would be "profitable to our country because this help 
to small business is truly an investment in our economy-strengthening our 
communities in peace--improving ow ability to meet the demands of 
defense."'72 Historically, small businesses had "not been sharing in the 
general prosperity of the country," according a Senate Report on the "Tax 
Problems of Small Busine~s.""~ Continued ownership of small businesses 
thus was articulated as one ofthe preconditions for overall nationalprosperity. 
168. David Cay Johnston, Feu Wealthy Farmers Owe Estate Tares, R q o r t  Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 10,2005, at A-21. The Times repotts that the Congressional Budget Office 
hinted that the actual numbr [of farmers lacking liquidity to pay taxes] might be zem. The 
[CongressionalBudget Officc] study examined how much incash, stocks and bonds these farmers 
let? to pay estate taxes, but the report noted that no data existed on how much life insurance the 
farmers had put into mtsts. Virtually all wealthy farmers m life insurance in mtsts,say estatetax 
lawyers who specialize in working with farmers. 
Id. 
169. See Small Business TaxRevision Act of 1958,Pub. L No. 89-866.6 206.72 Stat. 1606.1681: 
rrcalso 104 COUG. RFc. S17087-89 (dailyed. Aug. 12, 1958) (rratemmt of Sen. Kcrr summarillng the 
provirions of !he "m,all-business men's tsx.relief bilV [sic]). 
170. 104 CONG. REc S17089-90 (daily rd. Aug. 12, 1958) (nalemeot of Sen. Javits). 
171. 104 CONG. REC. S2029 (daily ed. Feb. 13. 1958) (statement of Sen. Pastore). 
172. Id. 
173. S. REP. NO. 85-1237, at 12 (1958). The SonateReport hinted, however, that oneofthemain 
benedriofrhc L'utmsrunaf~merapayeswteoxer would bepsycholo(pca1, notpractiea1,asmall business 
ownen wouldcventually hwe lo pay !he full estate lax liability ("For those [csratesl ~hichdrdgualify [for 
. ~ . . .  
the extension] it would prove of great help and would also have a psychological impact oo 
businessmen-giving a benetit which cannot be measured."). Id. at 12. 
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As one Senator reasoned, "what is good for small business is good for the 
count~y.""~ 
The link between small business health and national prosperity seems to 
have been asserted as an article of faith, without significant macroeconomic 
analysis. That a small business might not generate enough income to pay 
estate taxes was not viewed as proof of its lack of economic vitality, butrather 
as an indication that it deserved special protection. Large corporate 
conglomerates were described as an anathema to a system of free enterprise; 
small businesses were essential to the system'ssu~ival.'~~ In their statements, 
congressional leaders were careful to emphasize that the proposed extension 
of time to pay estate taxes would not necessarily result in the loss of revenue: 
"[Tlhe estate tax provision represents a spread forward of tax payments but 
does not reduce the amount which will ultimately have to he paid with respect 
to any specific e~tate.""~ In this way, the extension of time to pay estate taxes 
was presented as a revenue-neutral change to the law."' 
When refinements were made to 9 6166's extension rules in 1976,17' 
lawmakers again emphasized the unique nature of closely held businesses. 
They reiterated the importance of the extension, insofar as a closely held 
business' loss of one of its main owners might be devastating to a company's 
cash flow and "it may take several years before the business can regain 
sufficient fmancial strength to generate enough cash to pay taxes."179 
174. 104 CoNo. REC. S13775 (daily ed. July 15, 1958) (statement of Sen. Sparkman). Senator 
Sparkman lauded small businesses as'7he greatest job makers. They an great consumers. They an great 
producers." Id. 
175. 104 CONG. REC. S15793 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1958) (statement of Sen. Javits) ("[A]Ithough not 
removing any Federal estatetax in those cases, it is hoped that by spreading out the pdod  over which the 
estatetax may be paid it will be possible for the estate tax in mmt cases to be paid for out of earnings of 
the business, or at least that it wiilpmvide the heirs with the time to obtain h d s  to pay the Fede~al estate 
tax without upsetting the operating of the business. It is believed that this provision is particularly 
important in preventing cowrate mergers and in maintaining the free enterprise system."). 
176. Id. 
177. Revenue neutrality refers to the concept that "a change or proposed change in the tax system 
which results in the same amoUnt of revenue. The concept d m  not include neutrality as to each taxpayer 
but does imply revenue neutrality as to all taxpayers or the revenue system. A neutral change may rosult 
in increased taxes for corporatims and high income individuals, but offset by lower taxes on other 
taxDa~etS." ROBERT SELLERS SMITH. WEST'S TAX LAW DICTIONARY 769 (2004). 
. . 
178. In enacfingchanges to 5 6166 in 1976, theloint Committee on Taxation notes that existing law 
was "inadequate to deal with the IiauidiN t)mbIems enoerienccd bv estates in which a substantial uortion 
of the assets consist of a closely h i d  b&i;less or uhei illiquid ads*. In many cases, the execuior was 
fwced to sell a decedent's intereii in a farm or 0th- closeh, held businen in order to Day the estate tax" 
STAFF OF IOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PUBL'N NO. JCS:~~-76, GENERAL EX PLAN;^^ OF THE TAX 
REFORM ACTOF 1976, at 546 (1976). 
179. Id. 
PITTSBURGH TAX REVIEW 
Congress also believed that the law needed to be more flexible in granting 
extensions of time to pay taxes where estates were comprised of closely held 
businesses.1s0 Small business owners were a favored class of taxpayers who 
were singled out for special treatment. 
EI. FAMILY VALUES: PERSPECTIVES ON THE FAMILY 
The great variety in existing estate tax definitions of the family 
underscores the importance of the family to the overall system of wealth 
transfer taxation. Indeed estate taxation arose in response to the desire on the 
part of wealthy individuals to transfer wealth to their As people 
accumulatedgreatfortunes that could not be consumedin a single lifetime, the 
government sought to tax the transfer of wealth &om one generation to the 
next."' In response to early estate tax legislation, taxpayers became creative 
in minimizing their tax bills,'s3 and the law in turn became more 
complicated.lS4 
Apart from taxpayer creativity, one reason for the complexity of current 
estate tax rules is the complexity of modem family arrangements themselves. 
Family households constitute the majority of American households.1a5 
180. "Wlhere a substantial portion of the estateconsists of illiquid assets other than a farm or other 
closely held business, it has been excremcly difficult to obtain an extension rm the gmund of 'undue 
hardship'because the InternalRovenueSe~icegenerally takesarestrictiveapproach towardgrantingsuch 
extensions!' H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, at 3384-85 (1976). Fortbermore, obtaining a bond forestate tax 
payment requirements had became difficult or expensive for executors. Id. at 3385 ("[Mlany executors 
have found it both difficult and expensiw to obtain a bond to satisfy the extended payment requirements. 
Therefore, many executors refuse to elect the extended payment provisions because they must remain 
penonally liable for tax for the entire length of the extension."). 
181. W I U B A N K S , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  note 18, at 5 (noting also that war played arole in the enactment of an estate 
tax); see g e n e m l / y R a N ~ o r ~ ~ E .  PAUL, FEDFRAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (1942); MAX WEST, THE 
INHERITANCE TAX (1893). 
182. As Pmfessor Willbanks explains, “inheritance was viewed as a windfall increasing the ability 
to bear the burden of taxation!' WILLBANKS, supra note 18, at 5. 
183. See, e.&, DAVIDRDCKEFELLER,MEMOIRS~~-~~ (2002) (on John D. Rockefeller, Jr:s creation 
of significant msts for his family in 1934). 
184. Theestate tax was enacted in 1916. See WIUBANKS, supra note 18, at 5. The first significant 
reform of the estate tax occumd with the enactment ofthe Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80.471,62 
swt. 110. 
185. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES: 2000, at 2 tbl. 1 (2001), available at 
h~://m,census.gav/prod~2~~1~ubs/c2kbr~l-8.pdf. A family household consiaiof a "householder," 
themrsonin whose namethe housinxunitis owned, being bought or rented and"oneormorepeopleliving 
. - 
tog~ther, whoare related to the housihoidm by birth, marriage or adoption:' with or withoutotherpe~~li 
unrelated to the householder. Id. at 2. Families constitute 68.1% of all households. A slim majority 
(51.7%) of households are comprired of married taxpayers. The rest are female householders with no 
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Approximately 60.7% of all family households include children,lS6 but very 
few families resemble the traditional model of a working husband and a stay- 
at-home wife.Is7 According to the most recent census data, most women 
Many children live with one parent or neither parent, although the 
majority (68.7%) of all children live with two parents.lS9 Multigenerational 
households (e.g., a grandparent, parent and child all living together) are a 
significant percentage of all h o u ~ e h o l d s . ~ ~ ~ f  all persons over the age of 
fifteen years, a large percentage (I  8.5%) are divorced and remarried, but only 
27.1% have never ~narried.'~' These statistics point to the great variation in 
family composition. In light of the many ways in which American families 
differ from the traditional model, complexity in the estate tax law is perhaps 
husband present (12.2%), male householden with no wife present (4.2%) and two or more unrelated 
penons living togefher (6.1%). Approximately one-quarter of all households (25.8%) consist of single 
taxpayers living alone. Id. 
. . 
186. [ . 'S CEQSUS BUR FA^, ILUFRICA'S FAI I ILIESAN~ LI\ lK<i ARRtUGEUENTS: 2001. at tbl TI 
! (2001), ovatlohlr or hnp: wwv.crorus guv populalion www sacdernubl-fam cps2004hrml 
187 DONAI.U~~ERVNDEZ,U S.CLNSLS BuR~Au,YL.E T~IR,LUERICAN CHII.DREN, 912 fig. 1 (19931, 
a,<i~lable nr http wvw.ccnsus.~ov~psdwepr.oplc ur-IUpdf; see alrrl JASON F i ~ l u s .  U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, CHILDREN'S LIVING .A&AN~EMEN& AND CHARACTERISTICS: MARCH 2002, at 9 tbl. 4 (2003), 
available at http://m.census.gov/prod/2W3pubsip20-547 ARLENE F. SnLuTER & TERRY A. 
LUGAXLA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS: 
MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1996, at 4 tbl. D (1998), ovoilable at 
http:llwww.census.gov/prod~3i98pubs/p20~ 
188. @NEE E. SPRAGGINS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WE THE PEOPLE: WOMEN AND MEN IN THE 
USI?ED STATFS, 81 10 fig. Y (2005). otoilable or hnp: w ccnsua.gov prod 2005puhr ccnsi-20.pdi 
Ernpla)menf outs id^. the home is somewhat negativrly conr.lsted wxh hs\ing childrm. L' S. Ctusus 
RURTAL', .4UfRlC~'s FA\IILIES AKD 1.1vwG ARR.WGEhlEZ.TS 2003, sl lbi. FGI 12003). d~~al/rrb/r o  
hop: !nw.:msur pov population w w w  sucdrrnofhi-fan cps2U03 wbFGl-311-lpdf. 
! . . .  189. FIEWS, supra note 187, at 9 tbl. 4. As of ~arch;2002,22.8% of all children were living with l only theirmother, 4.6% were living with only their father, and 4.0% were living with no parent. Id. 
IJU. lor lhc )car 3U00, lhcrc were 3,929,122 rnult~gencrational hourrhold,, rrprcsenring3 7%ofall 
housuhalds. L' S.Cfh'Sus Bunmu,\tctTIGthEfLhTioh.\L ~ ~ O U S F t I O L D S F O R l i l t U N l T E D ~ T r \ T E S , S T n ~ E s ,  
, AND FOKPL LKTO RlCO 2000 (26OIJ. u v ~ ~ b ~ h l z u r h n p  www census gav populallon W cunZOOO phc- 
r 1 7  h:ml Oi:hoscrnuhi$cncnt~annl hauscholda,65 2'. w i r e  r ampnsdo i s  houschaldcr wth a child and 
g grandchild, 32.8% were comprised of a householder with parent and child, and 2.0% were comprised of ! a householder with parenf, child, and mandchild. 
Fiverndl~one~ght undred thou~and(3.6~~0,ofalI peopleaged 30 andover I~vingln householdsrcpon 
Ihar rhey wcw lbmnp wilh gr3nd:h~ldren under theagcufcightccn ymrs. 'Fa\ I.\ SllluOVs & J A N E  LAWI F R  
I)YF,GPU\NPI'AREN IS LIVNG u I T ~ I  GRA~DCHILDRFN:  2000 (?OU3), o~otlable urhrtp.1 www.census.gov. 
prod 2U03pubs c?kbr-31 pdf JLL~I undcr hali(42%) reported that they had pnrnary r apons~b~ l~ ty  for their 
~ ~ 
grandchildren. Id. 
191. ROSE M. -EIDER & TAVIA SIMMONS, MARITAL STATUS: 2000 (2003), available nt 
http:llwww.census.gov/prod~2003pubs/c2kbr31.pdf. This report does not include any meaningful 
information about same-sex couples, as "[ilndividuals who were living together (unmarriedpeople,people 
in common-law marriages) reported the marital status which they considered most appropriate." Id. at I. 
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not surprising, given that the estate tax arose in response to family weaith 
transfers.19' 
Apm from its revenue-generation function, viewed in a larger cultural 
context of family relationships, the estate tax rules perform two distinct 
functions: first, they acknowledge the personal and economic 
interconnectedness of individuals within families, and second, to a certain 
extent, they take into account diversity in family From the 
192. Seesupro notes 181-84 and accompanying text. 
193. The family has been a traditional focus of women's long-standing critiques of law and social 
policy. See generally Myra Man: Ferree, BeyondSeparote Spheres: Feminism &Family Research, 4 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAMtLY 866.84 (1990L Marie WithersOsmond & BanieThome.Feminisl Theoriex The 
Social Conshuction of ~ende;, in &Rc~eoo~ OF FAMILY THEORIES 591 (William Doherty et al. eds., 
1993). Nineteenth-cenmw activists. for examole. advocated for women's riaht to vote on the mound that 
- . 
laws relating to the family were inadequate to protect women's interests. See, e.g., Declaration of 
Senf i rnenS, repdnntPdin lH~~~o~~o~Wo~~~ SUFFRAGE~O-71 (ElizabethCady Stantonet al. eds., AYER 
Co., Publishers 1985) (1848-1861) (siatement of women's right8 activists at SenecaFalh, New York in 
1848). Historians twicallv view the Declaration of Sentiments as the seminal document that 
.. - 
commemorates the beginning of the woman sumage movement. See, eg. ,  A I L E E N  &&ADITOR. IDFAS 01. 
THEWO*IANSUFFRI\GEMOVEML~T 1890-192O.a l(lY65). Onnineteenth-0~nturyn'omen's votingrights 
and other activism. see Ariella R. Dubler, In the Shudow of Aforrioge: Sjngle Women and rhe Lepol 
Construrtiooa~theFomilvondtheStoa. I IZYAI.EL.J. 1641 (?M)3);RevaBSicgeLShurhePeoplr The 
~irieteenth tiendman, ~ e x ~ ~ u n l i ~ ,  Federdism a n d I b e ~ a k i l ~ ,  I I5 HARV. L.&v. 947 (2002). In an 
address to the state legislature in 1854. Elizabeth Cady Stahton critiqued the laws of marriage and the 
family: 
Lookat the positionofwoman as wife. Your laws relating to marriage-founded astheyare on the 
old common law of England, a compound of barbarous usages. Women] can get no redress for 
wrones in her own name in anv court of iustice. She can neither sue nor be sued. . . . Look at the 
- 
position ofwoman as mother. mere is no human love so strong and steadfast as that ofthemother 
for her child: vet behold how luthless are vour laws touching this most sacred relation . . . . The 
. 
father may apprentice his child, bind him out to a trade, without the mother's consent--y in 
direct opposition to her most earnest enheaties, pray- and tears. 
EL~ABETHCADY STANTON, ADDRBSS TO THE LEGISLATUREOF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, reprinted in 1 
HDTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, su~ra, at 595-605. To Stanton, the law rendaed women invisible and 
powaless, depriving them oflegal personhood and the ability to care for their childrm. 
Most formal obstacles to women's l c ~ a l  oqualitv were removed in the century following Stanton's 
famausstatement. See, r g ,  Recdv. Rced, 404 US. 71 (1971) (statute mvalid wheremale is preferred as 
administrator of an intestate estate): Fmnlicm v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (female milllary 
personnelcannot be required@ provedependencyof spouse inorder to obtaincertain benefits, wheremale 
personnelare notrequired to do so). Foministactivists and scholarsneverthelesshave mntinued to examine 
the family as one source of ongoing inequality bclueen men and women. See, e.g, Henna Hill Kay, 
&quu/ifyondDi/?P~enrr. The CoseofPreenuncy, I BERKELEY WOMEN'SL.J. 1 (1985);Dorolhy Robm. 
~ & u a l m d ~ ~ n i a l ~ o u S e w o r k ,  9 YALE~.L. &FEMINISM 51 (1997);Katha*ne Silbaugh, TurninsLobor 
intoLove: Housework and thekw,  91 Nw.U. L.REv. 1 (1996); JanaB. Singer, AlimonyandEflicienc~~ 
The Gendered Cosfs ond Benej?& ofthe Economic Just$cafion forAlimony, 82 GEo. L.J. 2423 (1994). 
Sociologist Jessie Bernard famously described that 'there are two marriages in e v w  marital union-his 
and hew-and that hi is bencr than hers." Maxine Bara Z ~ M .  Femjnhm ond Fomi/v Ludiesjhr o .Vrit, 
Century, 571 ANNALS 42.46 (?000)(describing Jersic Remard's classic 1ext.M~ FcTunE of hlaRnl~tiE 
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perspective of certain family law scholarship and gender theory, however, the 
estate tax rules are flawed in theoretical and practical terms because they fail 
to recognize the full diversity of American households and they valorize 
market labor. This Part borrows the lens of gender theory to explore how the 
current tax rules embrace progressive constmctions of the family, but do not 
go far enough in recognizing the complexity of human household 
relationships. 
A. Tax Rules and Interconnectedness 
Typically women's interests have been said to center on "caretaking and 
relationships, particularly with dependents."194 Recognitionofthe multiplicity 
of human connectedness reinforces values and knowledge that some scholars 
suggest are unique to women: an understanding that no person is ever wholly 
independent from others!95 To the extent they are concernedespecially with 
the identities (andbusinas activities) of a particular transferor, transferee and 
his or her respective family members,'96 the estate tax rules of $6 2036,2032A 
and 6166 are consistent with a jurisprudence of connectedness. That 
jurisprudence would suggest that no person is a classically individual rational 
actor, and every transfer must be viewed in its larger human wntext.lg7 
(1972)). Law pmfwsorMartha Fineman has extended and deepened that critique, exploring the extent to 
which the caretaking wok of familiec is perfanned largev by women, even though they may beengaged 
in work outside the home as well. Martha Albertson Fineman, Crackinn the Foundational Mylhs: 
btdependence. Autonomy, ondSelfSufleieney. 8 Ah,. U. J.GENllEn SOC. P;L'Y & L. 19-20 (2000j;sce 
also Ann Shalleck. FoundotionulM~thr and the Reolir) of'Dependency The Role oj.Uur<age, 8 AM. C. 
J GENI)ERSOC.POL'Y &L. 197,199-20 1 (2000). Professor Fincman argues that by "privalizing" women's 
carenking act~vioes in fimilia, the wale has been able to avoid engaging in that actlMtY iuelt Martha 
.. .
~lbertso~~in~nan,~rnkin~~ependency: Tir  Political Role ofFamily Rhetoric, 81 v*. L. REV. 2181, 
2187 (1995). 
194. Mary Bccker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards o Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 21,49. 
195. See Robin West, Jurisprudence ond Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988). Professor West 
explains that 
[wlomen are in some sense " c o ~ e ~ t e d "  to life and to other human beings during at least four 
recurrent and critical material expaiences: the expaience of pregnancy itself; the invasive and 
'%onnecting3' experience of heterosexual penehation, which may lead to pregnancy; the monthly 
experience of menstruation, which represents the potential for pregoancy; and the post-pregnancy 
experience of breast-feeding. 
Id, at 2-3. 
196. See supra notes 4.97-101 and accompanying text; see also i n f i  Part LB.3 (for purposes of 
5 2032A, "qualified use" of property may be by decedentor cenain members ofdccedent's family). 
197. On the role of the national actor in Law and Economics scholarship, see generally STEVEN 
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OFLAW 1 (2004) ("Given the characterierilation of individuals'behavior as 
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That women inparticular value human connectedness is suggested by the 
work of psychologist Carol Gilligan.I9' In her famous study of gender roles, 
Gilligan details the distinct responses of a boy and a girl to the same 
hypothetical involving a drug that aprotagonist needs but cannot afford for his 
dying wife.L99 The boy tells his interviewer that to "solve" the dilemma, the 
hypothetical protagonist should steal the drug.2'"he girl tells her interviewer 
that the hypothetical protagonist should reason with the pharmacist and 
explain that he needs the medicine for his sick wife.20' Gilligan characterizes 
the boy's response as exhibiting a "logic of justice," whereas the girl's 
response demonstrates an "ethic of care.'"02 If the logic ofjustice centers on 
a single decision-maker's determination of values, theh the ethic of care 
appeals to human sympathies and connections in search of an equitable 
solution?03 Gilligan's work illustrates just one of many possible ways in 
rational, the influences of legal ~ l e s  on behavior can be ascertained. 'his can bedone with definitude in 
the world of the models, because all relevant factors about individuals' desires, knowledge, and the 
environment will have been made explicit."). 
198. See CAROL GLLLIGAN, I  A DIEERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL ~ ~ E O R Y  AND WOMEN'S 
DEVELOPMENT (1982) lhereina%er IN A DIFFERENT VOICE]; klAPPiNG THE MORAL D o M ~ :  A 
COYTRlBtJ ClOX OF WOUFN'~ THINKNG TO pSyCHOLotiiC~1. ?NEORY *l*DEDUC.41 :<I% (CCO~ GIIIIP~D Ct 
ti. eda., 1988~;reeuiso MARY F<ELOB€L~+KY E I A L .  WD.\~PEI'S W A ~ S  01 KVD\VIUG ,1986). tiiiligan'\ 
work has been criticized as difficult to test empirically. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Walker. Sexism in 
Xoir/bera b Moral Psycholopy?. in MORAL DEVELOPMENT: AN INTRODUCTION 83-107 (W~lliam M. 
- 
Kunlnes& Jacob L G,uim.eds.. 1995). For an ovcMew ofcntiral rcrponirs la Glli~gan's work. .re Sard 
IdfTec 8: )me[ Sbtblq Hydc, (icttder Di)firarces in .Word Oriennrlo~z A . ! ( e / d - : f ! t d / ) ~ l ~ ,  I26 Ps?CliOl.. 
BULL 703 (20001, Slaurcen Rose Ford & Carol Ruoer iawer) ,  G~nde~ i ) ) f i r enrn  tn .\l,,rulReordnr,8g: 
A Connporison ol'rhr Use o(Jurtcc ond Core 0?tr~tttot;onr, 50 J PC~s~irnl.IrY & Soc P l r i ~ o l .  777 
(1986): 
199. IN A DIFFERENT VOICE, supra note 198, at 25-29. 
200. Id. at 26. 
201. Id. at27-28. 
202. Id. at29-30. The"ethicof care" has beencritiqued asreinfo1~ingtr8ditionalgendwstereo~pes. 
S~~,~.~,KATHARINET.BAR~ETTETAL.,GENDERANDLAW: THEORYDOCT~INEANDCOMMENTARY 813 
(3d edr2002). Law professor Kathryn Abrams has suggested that women's assumption of nurturing roles 
is a response "to employers' failwe to accommodate workers who are also parwts, or spouses' failure to 
. . 
snare thc darncstie m k s  that 611 d~spropon~onately to mothers uho continue lu %ark " K3tb1y1 Abrxrnr. 
5'o:oe,a/Coni!rucnon. RovtngB~olog~sm ondReasonoble nbmm, 41 DEPALI L KE\ IOZ1.1026 (1992) 
in contrast, law professor Richard Epstein suggests purely biological bases for women's behavior: 
Thenurmring instincts usuallyamibutable towomenarea set ofaniNdina1 adaptations that reduce 
the cost ofdoingactivitieies that help promote the survival of both her and her offspring. Although 
modem women operate in settings far different from those of their ancient mother, the initial 
tendency stiU remains: If n m r i n g  brings greaterpleasuie or requires lower costs for women than 
far men, thm we should expect ro see womm devote a greater percentage ofthcirresaurces to it 
than men. 
Richard A. Epstein, Gender $ for Nouns, 41 DEPAUL . REV. 981,990 (1992). 
203. For a generaldiscussion of theimpact ofGilligan's workonlegal reasoning, seeCameMenkcl- 
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which men and women may be different, but suggests that women place a 
particular premium on human relation~hips.2~~ This provides a context for 
evaluating the estate tax's emphasis on family relationships and suggests the 
way that the estate tax embraces the jurisprudence of connectedness. 
The estate tax law's preferences (andpenalties) for families acknowledge 
the human dimension of wealth transfers, particularly that the economic 
realities of any one transfer may depend on the identity of either the donee of 
an inter vivos gift or the legatee of a death-time transfer.20s Transfers to 
family members are treated in some instances more favorably than transfers 
to strangers,206 but replacement of a removed trustee is fraught ,with greater 
potential estate tax penalties when the replacement is a family member instead 
of a ~tranger.2~' The estate tax rules' embrace of a jurisprudence of 
connectedness is not complete, however. The rules do not fully account for 
the multi-dimensional aspects of human relations. The existence of family 
hostility, for example, is irrelevant to the determination of whether a 
corporation is "controlled" for purposes of 9 2036(a)(l)'s estate tax inclusion 
rule.20s The definition in 9 2036(h)(2) focuses on the holdings of the taxpayer 
and family members without regard to the qualitative nature of the 
interpersonal relationships (i.e., whether a person is in fact "controlled" by 
another). Similarly whether a particular family member-trustee is in fact 
"subordinate" with respect to the taxpayer-transferor is irrelevant for purposes 
of 5 2036(a)(2)'s inclusion The only relevant criterion is whether the 
trustee is a member of the prohibited class. So the tax laws recognize 
interconnectedness to a certain extent, but efficient application of the tax rules 
requires the overlay of bright line rules that may or may not reflect the 
realities of particular family relationships. The estate tax rules recognize 
some, but not all, connectedness between individuals. 
Meadow, Portia in o Dife~ent  Voice, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39.43-49 (1985). 
204. Although a thorough discussion of the nahlre of genda differences is beyond the scope of this 
article, for an overview of the ways that gender theories are applied to iurkprudence, see MARTHA 
CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST GOAL THEORY 15-22 ?id ed. 2003). - 
205. See discussion supra Parts LA-C. 
206. E g . ,  1.RC. 5 2032A(b) (qualified real property must have been used for a qualifying use by a 
member of a decedent's family). 
207. E . g ,  id. 5 2036(a)(2). 
208. See id. 5 2036(aXI);see also Lawrence Stern,ALfribution Rules'E&t on SfoekRcdemptions 
when FarniLvHostilily Exisa, 38 Sw. L.J. 887 (1984). 
209. E.g ,  I.R.C. 5 2036(a)(2). 
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B. Tar Rules and Diversit)? in Families 
1. How the Definitions Succeed 
Family law scholarship draws attention to the diversity in American 
families. That diversity requires the estate tax definitions of "family" or 
"related" persons to embrace modem .family configurations to some extent. 
For example, perhaps in a nod to the prevalence of divorce, 8 2036(b)(2), 
which is applicable to $2036(a)(1), provides that the holdings of a taxpayer- 
transferor's spouse will not be aggregated with the taxpayer's if the spouses 
are separated under a decree of divorce or separate 'maintenance?" In 
possible acknowledgment of multigenerational families (and the likelihood 
that an adult may be taking care of elderfy parents as well as minor children), 
a parent is a "related or subordinate" party for purposes of 8 2036(a)(2), and 
therefore cannot be removed or replaced as a trustee of a trust created by the 
taxpayer?" Similarly, siblings are defined as members of the "family" for 
purposes of $$2032A and 6166;" recognizing the role of extended family in 
closely held or family-owned businesses. Given the irregular nature of the 
American family, these expansive definitions of families are appropriate. 
2. How the Definitions Fail 
At least in the popular imagination, the term "family" calls up an image 
of a grouping of persons related by blood or marriage. The stereotypical 
family is organized around a heterosexual mamed couple and their 
descendants?13 The estate tax rules are oriented toward this vision of the 
nuclear family, allowing for some variations within a traditional bandwidth. 
Yet the multiple estate tax definitions of family do not recognize the same 
variations on the traditional structure. For example, 5 2032A is the only one 
of the four provisions to include within the definitionof family" stepchildren 
and spouses of lineal descendants of the transferor or the transferor's 
spouse?I4 Likewise, $ 2036(b)(2)'s defmition of a controlled corporation is 
210. Id. d.$2036(aXI), @)(2), 318(a)(l). 
211. Rev. Rul. 95.58. 1995-2 C.B. 1:see LR.C. PF, 2036(a)(2),672(c). This example assumes that 
. . . . . .  
the parent is not a nonadverse party with respect to the taxpayer-transferor. I.R.C. 5 2036(a)(2). 
212. I.R.C. $5 2032A(e)(Z)(D), 6166@)(2)(D), 267(c)14). 
213. Consider, for example, that all persons shown in Figure A likely would be considered members 
of Dora Ewing's extended 'Yamily" as the term is used popularly. 
214. 1.R.C. 5 2032A(e)(2XD); cf: id. $5 2036(aX1), @)(2), 318(a)(lXA), 2036(a)(2), 672(c), 
6166@)(2)(D). For purposes of 5 2036(a), the failure to include stepchild~n, as an example, within the 
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the only one ofthe four subject Code sections not to include siblings.2" In the 
case of 2036, this seems to be an explicit policy choice in light of the 
section's concern with control.2t6 Whatever the reasons, though, the 
definitions are inconsistent in their recognition of the diversity of families. 
The inconsistency of the estate tax's definitions of family is matched by 
their underinclusivity. Existing estate tax defmitions recognize traditional 
families, stepfamilies and extended families, but they do not recognize 
nonmarital associational relationships that some people consider to be 
"family." The estate tax maintains this approach even in the face of state laws 
that grant some of those "families" limited legal recognition. For example, 
under New Jersey's Domestic Partnership Act:" opposite sex partners who 
are both sixty-two years of age or older and same sex partners (who are not 
permitted to many under New Jersey law) may register as domestic 
partners.2Is Registration of the domestic partnership is meant to afford 
definition of family can be read as a pro-taxpayer rule. For example, a stqrchild*~ holdings will not be 
aggregated with the taxpayer-tnutsferor's for purposes of the definition of a controlled corporation under 
$2036(a)(l). Seesupra notes21-25 and accompanying text. Likewise, tothe extent thatthe descendants 
ofa taxpayer'sspouseare not "relater to the taxpayer, thetaxpayerpresumablycould remove and replace 
a stepchild-mstee without negative tax consequences. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying texf. 
Consider, however, that for purposes of 8 6166, the failure to include stepchildren within the definition of 
"family" acts to the dettimenl of tho taxpayer. A stepchild's hold' is will not be aggregated with the 
decedent's f a  purposes ofthe 45-person ownership cap. See I.R.C. 8 6166@)(1)(B)(ii). 
215. See I.R.C. 8 2036@)(2). As with stepchikiren, the failure to include s i b l i n ~  within the 
definition offamilycan be readas apro-taxpayer rule. Seesupra notes21-25,214 and accompanyingtext. 
216. Thesectimperhapreflectsthc beliefthat in thecontextofa fdmilybusiness, siblings, byvirme 
of natural rivalry or divagent financial needs, are not likely to control m e  another. 1 am gmeful to 
Professor Ronaki H. Jensen f a  this insight. 
217. N.J. STAT. ANN. g 2638A-1 (West 2005). 
2 18. A domesic partner is defined as "a p r sm who is in a relationship that satisfies the definition 
of a domestic pamership," where domestic partnership is defined as a "fdmilial relationship" in which 
individuals "choose[] to live together in i m p o m  pe~sonal, emotional and mnomic wmmined 
relationships with another individual:' Id. 5 2638A-3. The requiremenu of a domestic partnership ~IC: 
(1 )Both oersonshaveacommon residenceand are otherwise iointlv resvonsible for each other's 
. . . - .  
common welfdreasevidenced byjoint financialarrangements orjoint ownershipofreal orpemnal 
oronem. which shall be demonstrated bv at least one of the follow in^: "  - 
(a) a joint deed, mortgage apemen1 or lease; 
(b) a joint bank acwunt: 
. .  . 
(c) designation of one of the pasons as a primary beneficiary in the other person's will; 
(dt desimation ofoneof t h e m m s  as a orimarvbeneficiar~in the other person's life 
. 
insurance policy or retirement plan; or 
(e) joint ownership of a motor vehicle; 
(2)Both personsagree to bejointly responsible for each other's basic living expensesduringthe 
domestic partnership; 
(3) Neither person is in a marriage recognized by New Jersey law or a member of another 
domestic parhership; 
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domestic partners certain legal benefits under state law.'I9 Yet for federal 
estate tax purposes, these persons are not considered members of the same 
''family"220 in the several ways that the statutes define that term. Consider, for 
example, a variation on Hypothetical 2.221 
(4) Neither person is related to the other by blood or affinity up to and including the fourth 
deme  of consanrminiw; 
- - .  
(5) Both persons are of the same sex and therefore unable to enter into a marriage with each 
other that is recomized by New Jersey law, except that two persons who are each 62 years of age 
- 
or older andnot ofthe same sexmay establish a domstic partnership ifthey meet therequiiements 
set foah in this section; 
(6) Both persons have chosen to share each other's lives in a committed relationship of mutual 
caring; 
(7) Both,persons are at least 18 years of age; 
(8) Both persons file jointly an Affidavit of Domestic Pametship; and 
(9) Neither person has been a partner in a domestic pamiership that was terminated less than 
180 days prior to the filing of the current Affidavit of Domestic Partnership, except that this 
prohibition shallnot apply if one ofthe partnersdied; and, inall cases in which a person registered 
a prior domestic parinership, the domestic partnership shall have been terminated in accoldance 
with the provisions of section 10 of P.L. 2003, c. 246 (C.26:8A-10). 
Id. 5 2638A-4. 
219. The law is meant to provide, among other things, for pmtection against discrimination in 
housing, eligibility for covemge of state employees' domestic partners under certain state-administered 
benefit program, hospital visitation rights, and otha health beneflts to those who register as domestic 
pamen. Id. 6 2638A-2. For an averview New Jersey's Domestic Pamienhip Act, see Thomas Pro1 & 
Danirl Weiss,I.i@tngo Lomp: 12'iIl N m  Jnsq Crrore a Sh /  Itarbor for ( i q u n d  Lr,biur Imn<iporton 
Ri.qkts7.227 N I .  LA* 22 (2004); FeliceT. I.<nda, The Pmddt.m o/Son~r-Sexhldrriagc Rightr. I3 N J. 
LAW. WKLY. NEWSPAPER 1759 (2004). 
220. BecauseDOMAprovides that forfederalpqoses,mmiageis definedasalegal union between 
s man and a woman, I U.S.C. 7 (2006), a New Jersey domestic partnership likely would not be 
recognized for federal estate tax purposes. See also CAL. FAM. CODE $9 297-299.6 (West 2005) 
(California's domestic partnership law). 
221. For consistencyin illustration, Hypothetical 8 envisions DomEwing's acquiring an unmam'ed 
opposite-sex partner. The same results would obtain with a same-sex par!ner, regardless of whether Dora 
Ewingand the partnerweremarried, parties to a civilunionorregistereddcmestic partners. Seesupra note 
16. 
Ifsame-sex marriage were to be recognized for federal tax purposes, the provisions of $8 2036(a)(l), 
2036(a)(2), 2032A and 6166, among othas, probably would not need to be revised significantly in order 
to accommodate this newtype of family arrangement Seesupra note 16. This assumes that a taxpayer's 
same-sex partner would be defined for federal ~ o s e  Ifthis werenotthecase, 
thestatutes would need to berwisedso that thesamesexpainer is brought within the definition offamily 
member. If same-sen marriage remains unrecognized for kieml tax purposs, though, study of the 
conflicting meanings offamily in the estate taxlaw at least invitesreconsiderationof the issue. In claiming 
the right to marry, same-sex couples knowingly invoke all ofthose benefits and burdens of the taxsystem. 
See supra note 16. Same-sex marriage activists evidence awareness of the dual beneficial-burdensome 
nahw ofthe estate laxsystem in advising taxpayers against selective self-application of the taxmles. See 
Gay and Lesbian Advocates and DeTenders, Nnvigating Income Tmesfor  Mam'ed Same-Se+ Couples, 
w~w.glad.or~rightsltaxe~~for~married~~oupIe~~h~ (same-sex mmied couples should be consistent in 
their approach to tax rules "to prevent others from using the designation 'single' to argue or prove that a 
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Hypothetical 8. Assume that D o n  Ewingsurvives her husband, Roland Lucas, and later 
enters into a long-tcrmcommittcdrelationship with Mr. Z (not shown in Figure A). Dora 
Ewing and .Mr. 2 live together in a marital-like relationship, but they are not married. 
When they arc both residents of the State of New Jersey and over the aee of sixty-twu 
years, they register their domestic partnership with &e applicable st& autho"ties. 
Further assume that Dora Ewing owns 5% of Company Y's total outstanding stock. 
Company Y has only one class of stock, and all shares have the same voting rights. 
Pursuant to Company Y's hy-laws and the applicable shareholder agreement, any 
shareholder may transsr an underlying equity interest in any stock without also 
t r a n s f d g  the voting rights associated with the stock. One year before her death, Dora 
Ewing transfers to Friend Frank, an unrelated third party (not shown in Figure A), the 
underlying equity interest in all of her Compauy Y stock. At the time of Dora Ewing's 
death, Dora Ewing retained her voting rights and Mr. Z owns 95% of the Compauy Y 
stock. At the time of her death, Dora Ewing and Mr. Z had lived together for over 25 
years. 
In this case, Dora Ewing's estate can avoid entirely the application of 
$ 2036(b)(2) because she personally has the right to vote only five percent of 
Company Y Mr. Z's 95% ownership is not attributed to her under 
$318 and $ 2036(b)(2), even though Dora Ewing and Mr. Z lived together in 
a domestic partnership recognized by state law, and the fact that his ownership 
would be attributed to her if they had been mamed.223 Unlike in Hypothetical 
1 and Hypothetical 2, the full value of the stock transferred to Friend Frank 
therefore escapes inclusion in Dora Ewing's gross estate under 
$ 2036(b)(l):24 notwithstanding her long-term, family-like relationship with 
Mr. Z, the Company's majority owner. To facilitate application of the law, 
the Code employs a bright line test for determining who is a member of the 
family.z25 The Code does not look on a case-bycase basis at each taxpayer's 
transfer. 
person is not really married when that issue arises in other legal contexts:');see olso Dom,supra note 16, 
at 23 (suggesting that married same-sex couplesshauld "act as though Ihey werebound by Code provisions 
limiting intrafanily wealth transfers. Opting into such requirements would also avoid the need for 
'emergencyplanning' ifDOMA were to beovertmedorrepealedandsame-sex maniages wereto become 
recogpized for Federal tax purposes."). 
222. See supra note 221. 
223. See supra note 221. Contrast this with the resuh in Hypothetical 2 where Dora Ewing's 
ownership was aggregated with her father's. 
224. I.R.C. $2036(b)(l), (2). 
225. The bright-line test in some sensemay bea function of evidentiaryconcm. That is, toavoid 
undertaking a case-by-case analysis of all of a decedent's transfers, the law establishes a rnle for who is a 
member of the decedent's "family." Who is "family" is determined by legal relationships that can be 
determined with catainty, as birth, death and maniage records are for the most pad documented by the 
state, making it easy to prove thme relationships. 
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In Hypothetical 8, the federal estate tax law's failure to recognize the 
state domestic partnership enables a taxpayer to escape taxation on a 
transaction that substantively resembles one that istaxedundercurrent law.*16 
But there are situations in which the law's failure to recognize nonmarital 
families will render the taxpayer ineligible for certain tax benefits. Consider, 
for example, this variation on Hypothetical 7. 
Hwothetical 9. Assume as in Hwothetical 7 that Dora Ewinz survives her husband. 
. . . . - 
Roland Lucas, and later enten into a long-term committed relationship with Mr. Z (not 
shoum in F i m  Al.  Dora Ewine and Mr. Z live together in a marital-lke relsionshi~. 
but they arenot married. whenlthey are both residents of the State of New Jersey and 
over the age of 62. thev reeister their domestic oartnershi~ with the ao~licable state 
. - 
authorities. ~ur thkr  assume that four years bekre her death, Dora g win^ inherits 
Greenacre from her father, William Ewing. Greenacre is real orooertv located in the 
United States that is used k a family-owngd business operated ky DO& Ewing. At her 
death, Dora Ewinp: besueaths Greenacre to her lonz-time com~anion. Mr. 2. Assume 
- .  
that Dora Ewing's executor elects to have 8 2 0 3 2 ~  apply ti the e s k e  and files the 
necessiny recapture agreement. 
In Hypothetical 9, Dora Ewing's estate will not be eligible for the application 
of the special valuation rules of Cj 2032A because it does not meet the 
threshold  requirement^,].^^ even though her executor elects to have 5 2032A 
apply to the estate and files the necessary recapture agreement.22s Although 
Dora Ewing is a citizen and resident of the United States,].19 and Greenacre is 
located in the United States, Mr. Z is not a "qualified heir" of Dora Ewing 
because he is not her h~sband.~"' Greenacre thus is not "qualified real 
property" and the special valuation rules will not apply.231 
Just as Dora Ewing's nonmarital relationship means that favorable estate 
tax valuation rules were unavailable under Cj 2032.4, a similar unavailability 
of tax benefits occurs under 8 61 66. 
Hypothetical 10. Assume that Dora Ewing dies with a gross estate valued for estate tax 
ournoses at S10,000.000. Further assumethu the onlvassetsoftheestateare$6.000.000 
. . 
In cash andS4,OU0,000 of stock of Company Y. Asiume that Dora Ewing is one of 50 
shareholders of Cumuany Y. Each shareholder, including Dora Ewinr, owns 1.000 
shares valued at $4,060 pet share ($4,000,000 in aggregatep The c o G t i o n  has no 
226. Spe supra Hypothetical 2. 
227. See supra notes 63-67 and aacompanying ten. 
228. See LR.C. 5 2032A(a)(l)(A). 
229. Id. 3 2032A(a)(lXA); seesupra note 64and accompanyingtext. 
230. LR.C. 5 2032A(e)(2)(C) (lineal descendants are "members of the family"). 
231. Id. 5 2032A(a)(lXA). A similar preclusion from bmefits would occur under 5 6166 
232. As in Hypothetical 7, assume that no valuation diswunts are applicable. 
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other voting stock and all stock has the same voting rights. Of the 49 shareholders other 
than Dora Ewing, one is her father, William Ewing; one is her brother, James Ewing; one 
is her son, William Lucas; one is her daughter, Nell Lucas; and the other is MI. 2, Dora 
Ewing's long-termcornpanion. The other44 shareholders are notrelated to Dora Ewing 
many way. 
As in Hypothetical 7 above, Company Y is not aclosely held corporationwith 
respect to Dora Ewing based solely on her individual holdings; she personally 
owns only two percent (or 1,000 out of 50,000) of the corporation's voting 
shares. Furthermore, Dora Ewing's interest in Company Y does not qualify 
as an "interest in aclosely held business" because Company Y does not have 
fewer than 45 shareh01ders.z~~ It is true that under $ 6166(b)(2)@), Dora 
Ewing's stockownership is aggregated with that of her brother, James Ewing; 
her father, William Ewing, her son, William Lucas; and her daughter, Nell 
Lu~as.2~' Her ownership is not aggregated with Mr. Z's, though, because he 
is not a "member" of her "family" under $ 6166 (regardless of whether the 
couple entered into and registered their domestic pattnership under New 
Jersey law, for example)?35 Company Y therefore is deemed to have 46 total 
shareholders (i.e., Dora Ewing,Mr. Z and theother 44 individuals who are not 
related to her in any way) and her estate will be ineligible for the deferred 
payment provisions of 8 6166;216 This is true even though Dora Ewing and 
Mr. Z are in a long-term committed relationship with characteristics similar 
to marriage. Had they been married, their ownership would have been 
aggregated and Dora Ewing's estate would have qualified for the extension 
under $ 6166.z3' The estate tax law fails to incorporate the attention of family 
law and gender scholarship to the associational relationships that some people 
call "families." 
C. Tar Rules and Market Participation 
An additional insight of recent family law scholarship is the way in which 
women's caretaking activities frequently lead women themselves to become 
de~endent.2~~ According tothis theory of "derivative dependency,"239 because 
233. I.R.C. 8 6166(b)(l)(C)(ii). 
234. Id. 5 6166(b)(2)(D). 
235. Id. 
236. Id. $6166(a). 
237. Id. 5 6166(b)(Z)(D). 
238. Fineman, Crackingthe Foundational Myths, supra note 193, at 2l;see also SuzannaDanuta 
Waiters, Breaking Up Is Hard To Do: Commenrr on Martha Finemon's FoundotionalMyths, 8 AM. U .  
J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 205,214 (2000) (~TiticizingFinernan's work as falling "far short of the kind 
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women have primary responsibility for the care of small children and the 
elderly, they are unable to participate to the same extent as men in wage- 
earning activities and thus become "dependent on the resources necessary for 
that care."240 
Insofar as the estate tax laws reward market-based activities, such as 
participation in a family business:" they accord certain benefits to wage- 
earning behavior that are not bestowed on caretaking activities. Yet if the 
estate tax laws reward market behavior, that is also because the fruits of 
market labor (i.e., "qualified real property"242 or a closely held business 
interest243) are subject to estate taxati0n.2~~ Caretaking activities, in contrast, 
do not produce any assets that will be subject to estate taxation:45 and the 
estate tax's failure to provide any benefit for them does not disadvantage the 
caretaker. The caretaker-taxpayer is in no worse a position than one who 
engages in qualifying market a~tivities.2"~ 
IV. FAMILY UNITY: PROPOSALS TO RESOLVE THE ESTATE TAX'S 
CONFLICTING DEFINITIONS OF FAMILY 
Given the complex and incomplete estate tax definitions of .family, it is 
worthwhile to consider the possibility of reform. This Part N evaluates five 
possible approaches to the problem of the conflicting meanings of family in 
estate tax law. First, this Part considers the adoption of a unifonn'defmition 
of radical restructuring that needs to take place."). 
239. Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths, supra note 193, at 20. 
760 Id - . -. 
241. See LR.C. 66 2032A(b)a) foualified use is "use as a Etrm for farmine oummes" or "use in a ". , ,. . ,. -. . 
irdeorbusinessotherthan the trade orbusiness offarming"); 6166(b)(l)(A)-(C)(only pamership interest 
orstockinacorporation is countedindeterminationofestate'seligibility forextensionoftime topayestate 
taxes). 
242. See id. 4 2032A(a)(l), @)(I). 
243. See id. 4 6166(a), (b)(l). 
244. Cf id. 66 2001 (estate tax im~csed on the taxable estate of e m  dcedentwho is a citizen or 
resident of theunited state), 2051 (taxable estate means gmss estate minus ;emin deductions), 203 1 (the 
value of the mass esiate includes the value at the time of the decedent's death of all orooertv. real or 
. . .  . 
personal, tangtblc or intangible, wherever siruatrd). Sribon 2053 permit, deductions 1.21 cxpcnscs, 
indcbrednesssnd rase Smtlon 20SJpcrmw adcdunlon ia1osc.s. Secltan 2055 oru\,ides iadeducoons 
for charitable bequest$ legacies, devises or transfers. Section 2056(a) provides for a marital deduction for 
"the value of any interest in prwewwhich passes or has passed &om the decedent to his or her suwivine 
. - .  
spouse, but only to the extmt such interest is included in determining the value of the gross estate." 
245. Id. $8  2051,2031. 
~ ~ 
246. See wpro notrs242-43. For an interesting dlscurs~on ofiherolr. aflau in uurnen'r racialand 
polttical advancement, see D u r n  Rosmblurn, Pon4,Dispartry The Polit~col Reprerenrurion ofGender 
on the Tightrope ofliherol Conslihrfio~fa/ Tmdifiorrs, 39 DAVIS L. REV. 11 19 (f006). 
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of family for estate tax purposes. Second, this Part contemplates the complete 
elimination of estate tax rules thatpenalize taxpayers or awardpreferences to 
them based on family relationships. Third, this Part evaluates the desirability 
of eliminating only the family-based preference rules. Fourth, this Part 
explores increasing the estate tax exemption in order to reduce the number of 
taxpayers who must navigate the complex definitions of family. Fifth, this 
Part suggests revising the language used in the statutes in order to achieve 
integrity in their interpretation and application. 
A. Adopt a Uniform Definition of Family 
Minimizing complexity in the tax law by adopting a uniform definition 
has a recent precedent. In 2004, the 108th Congress enacted a uniform 
definition of "child" for certain income tax purposes.247 A similar uniform 
approach to defining "family" in estate tax law would have at least the 
perception of simplicity. A seemingly unlimited number of uniform 
definitions could be offered, but this subpart considers the results under two 
alternate scenarios: (1) the adoption of a "narrow" definition of "related" 
persons modeled on the definition made applicable to 5 2036(a)(1) by 
9 2036@)(2) (i.e., a taxpayer's spouse, children, g~andchildrenandparents);~~~ 
and (2) the adoption of a "broad" definition of family modeled on the 
definition contained in 9 2032A (i.e., a taxpayer's ancestors, spouse, any 
lineal descendant of the taxpayer, a linealdescendant ofthe taxpayer's spouse, 
any descendant of the taxpayer's parents and the spouse of any lineal 
descendant of the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse or any descendant of the 
taxpayer's  parent^).''^ This subpart evaluates the advantages and 
disadvantages of each proposal. 
247. Working FamiliesTax RelidAct af2004, Pub. L. No. 10&311,§ 201,118 Stat. 1166,1169. 
Theuniformdefioitionofchild applies for purposes of 5 2(b) (definitionofhead ofhwsehold), 4 21 (credit 
for expensesfor dependent care), $24(ehildtar credit), $ 32 (earned income credit) and $151 (exemption 
for devendents). To sualifv as a "child" under the uniform definition. the child must satisfi three 
. . 
~cquircmcnti: ''(1, [rlesid~ncy (the child has the same princtpsl place of abode 3s th~. taxpqcr tbr morr 
than halfthe t ; u  )ear). (2)  Rzlattonrh~~ (Iherhtld ic the wmaver's ron.&uehtcr.steo-child.brother. sister. 
. . . .  . . . . . - . .  . . 
step-sibling, or a descendant ofany such individual). (3) Age (generally, the child must be under age 19, 
or24 ifa full-timestudent)." Congress Enacts the Working Families TarReiiefActof2004,101 J. TAX'N 
195 (2004); see oiso Stephen Winn, Longing for Simpiiciry: Loopholes Complicate the Work of the 
AverageTrpoyer,K~xsas C~TYSTAR, Mar. 23,2005, atB7; Jill Hammoo, TaxPlonningNeverEndrfir 
Profesdonais, INDLANAPOL~S STAR, Mar. 14.2005, at COI; Mike Ereeman, New Laws CouldLower Your 
Tar Bill, SAN DIEGOUNION-Tm., Feb. 6,2005, at H-2. 
248 Tee wpra nore 27 and areompanymgtext 
249 See supru note, 73-77 and scrompanyng te,e 
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I .  Adopt I.R.C. § 2036@)(2)'s Narrow Dejnition 
Consider the consequences of an across-the-board adoption ofthe narrow 
definition of "related" persons made applicable to 5 2036(a)(l) by 
4 2036(b)(2). Such a restrictive approach to family is not exclusively pro- 
government or pro-taxpayer and might result in the under-taxation of some 
transactions and over-taxation of others, using congressional intent and 
existing levels of taxation as a referent. 
a. Impact on Estate Tax Inclusion 
In the case of the estate tax inclusion rule of 8 2036(a)(2), if the universe 
of potentially "related and subordinate" persons were limited to a taxpayer's 
spouse, children, grandchildren and parents,zS0 it would become too easy for 
the taxpayer to retain control over transferred property but still escape 
taxation. In particular, a taxpayer could create a trust and retain an unlimited 
power to remove and replace the trustee with a new trustee from a class that 
includes the taxpayer's ~ibling.~'' Because a sibling would not be a member 
of the "family" under a narrow definiti~n,~'~ he or she would be treated as a 
stranger (in a tax sense) to the taxpayer, and there would be no adverse 
consequences to the taxpayer's retained right to remove and replace. The 
taxpayer thus could retain effective control over the transferred property, even 
though this control is precisely the type that Congress believed should trigger 
inclusion under 5 2036(a)(2).253 Too many transfers would escape taxation, 
and so a narrow uniform definition of family wonld result in the systematic 
under-taxation of transactions under 5 2036(a)(2). 
b. Impact on Estate Tax Valuation and Payment 
A narrow definition not only would cause under-taxation under 
4 2036(a)(2), but also would cause over-taxation under $$2032A and 6166. 
For these latter two sections, a narrow definition of family would mean a 
smaller group of persons whose ownership and business activities could inure 
250. I.R.C. 8 318(a)(l)(A) (incorporated by reference into $ 2036@)(2)'s definition of cant~olled 
corporation). 
251. See supra note 36. 
252. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
253. See supra Part U.A. 
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to the benefit of the taxpayer. For example, consider again Hypothetical 5. 
In that case, Dora Ewing's failure to participate personally in the business is 
no obstacle to the application of § 2032A to her estate because the 
participation of her brother, James Ewing, redounds to Dora Ewing's 
benefit.'$' Contmst the results under a narrow definition of family. Under a 
narrow definition, James Ewing would not be a "member" of Dora Ewing's 
"family,'n55 and so Greenacre would fail the test for "qualified real 
pr~perty.'"~~ It then would be ineligible for the special valuation rule under 
$ 2032A.257 By narrowly defining the "family" as a taxpayer's spouse, 
children, grandchildren and parents:$' fewer estates would qualify for the 
special valuation rules of $ 2032A, resulting in greater incidence of taxation 
than under current 
Similar to its impact on the availability of $ 2032A, the narrow definition 
of family would cause greater incidence of taxation under $ 6166. The fewer 
people whose ownership may be attributed to the taxpayer, the fewer estates 
will qualify for the extension of time in which to pay taxes. Although 5 6 166 
admittedly would be affected less than $ 2032A (because of $6166 '~  greater 
definitional similarities to "related" parties under $) 2036(b)(2)),260 adopting 
a narrow definition of family likely would result in a similar increase in the 
incidence of taxation compared to current law.261 
From both the government's and taxpayers' perspectives, the universal 
adoption of the narrow definition of "related" persons made applicable to 
$ 2036(a)(1) by $ 2036(b)(2) would have mixed benefits. The government 
would be distressed (and taxpayers pleased) that fewer transactions would be 
taxed under $ 2036(a)(2):62 but the government would be pleased (and 
taxpayers distressed) by fewer estates qualifyingfor the special valuation rules 
254. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
255. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
256. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. 
257. See supra notes 63-67 and accomoann'ne text. 
. . "  
258. See stgrn notr 27 and accompanying text. 
259. 1 % ~  analpis armmcs current lcvels of taxation as the bascllne measure. u~thuut n a m r i v e  
judgment about fie apprapriate level of taxation. 
260. Seeinfra Appendix. The only difference betweentheproposednmow defimtim of familyand 
8 6166 is that the narrow definition doa not include siblings whseas 8 6166 does. LR.C. 
$5 6166(b)QKD), 267(cX4). Siblings arcnot membersof the family far purposes o f$  2036(a)(1). Cf id. 
$8 2036(a)(i), 2036@)(2),318(a)(l)(A). 
261. Cf I.R.C. $8 6166@)(l)(B), (2)(D). 
262. See supra Part IA.2. 
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of 9 2032A2" and extensions of time to pay estate taxes under 5 6166?64 For 
these reasons, implementing a narrow uniform definition of family likely 
would gamer little support fkom either constituency. Furthermore, a narrow 
definition of family would not effectuate legislative intent. Congress was 
concernedabout taxpayers whosought to evade estate taxation while retaining 
control overtran~ferredproperty?~~ and a narrow defmition of "fami1y"as the 
spouse, children, grandchildren and parents would create opportunities for the 
very type of strategic behavior that Congress sought to minimize. Similarly, 
a narrow definition of family for purposes of $5  2032A and 6166 would 
preclude tax relief for the very types of estates that Congress intended to 
benefit?66 As a policy matter, adoption of a narrow definition would he 
inconsistent with legislative purpose. 
2. Adopt I.R.C. j2032A's Broad Definition 
If adoption of a uniformnarrow definition of family would be unpopular 
or undesirable %om a policy perspective, it is instructive to consider the 
opposite-adopting a broad definition of family. Of all the Code sections, 
5 2032A takes the broadest approach267 by defining the family asa taxpayer's 
ancestors, spouse, any lineal descendant of the taxpayer, a lineal descendant 
of the taxpayer's spouse, any descendant of the taxpayer's parents and the 
spouse of any lineal descendant of the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse or any 
descendant of the taxpayer's pa~ents.2~' Not surprisingly, though, universal 
adoption of this broad definition of family would cause a pattern of both 
under-taxation and over-taxation. 
a. Impact on Estate Tar Inclusion 
Adopting 5 2032A's broad definition as the uniform estate tax definition 
of family would cause more transactions to be taxed under 5 2036 than are 
currently. A broad definition also would tax more transactions than are 
necessary in order to address lawmakers' concerns about taxpayer control over 
transferred assets. Consider another hypothetical. 
263. See supra Part LB. 
264. See supra Part LC. 
265. Seesupra Part U.A. 
266. See supra Part II.B, C .  
267. See supro Part I.D. 
268. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying told 
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Hypothetical 11. Assume the same facts as in Hypothetical 1, except that Dora Ewing 
owns 5% of Company Y's totaloutstanding stock. DoraEwing again transfers toFriend 
Frankher underlying equity interest in all of her Company Y stock Dora Ewing retains 
the right to vote the shares. At the time of Dora Ewing's death, her sister-in-law, Mary 
Mack, owns 95% of the Company Y stock. 
Under 9 2036(b)(2)'s existing definition of a controlled corporation, Mary 
Mack is not a member of Dora Ewing's famil~,2'~ and so Dora Ewing's five 
percent ownership is not aggregated for estate tax purposes with Mary Mack's 
95%?70 Under current law, the Company Y stock is not included in Dora 
Ewing's e~tate.2~' If 8 2032A's broad definition of family were adopted, 
however, Mary Mack wouldbe considered amember of Dora Ewing's family 
under the new definition?" The constructive ownership rules thus would 
cause Mrs. Ewing to be the deemed owner of 100% of Company Y's stockand 
it wouldbe a controlledcorporation with respect to her?73 As in Hypothetical 
1, then, the full value of the stock transferred to Friend Frank would be 
included in Dora Ewing's gross estate under 5 2036(a)(1).?74 This is 
inappropriate because, in fact, in a small business owned 5% by a taxpayer 
and 95% by her sister-in-law, the shareholders likely will have different 
economic i~terests?'~ 
Similar to the result under 9 2036(a)(1), adoption of 8 2032A's broad 
definition of family would cause more transfers to be included in a taxpayer's 
gross estate under $ 2036(a)(2) than are presently included. By way of 
illustration, under current law, a taxpayer's cousin is not "related" to the 
taxpayer for purposes of 4 672(c) and 9 2036(a)(2)?76 Thus, without adverse 
tax consequences, a taxpayer can retain the unrestricted right to remove a 
trustee who has discretionary authority to make distributions from the trust 
and replace the trustee with his or her cousin, for example.?" If a broad 
269. I.R.C. 5 318(a)(l)(A) (incorporated by ref~ence into 5 2036@)(2)'s definition of controlled 
corporation). 
270. See id. 5 2036(b)(2). 
271. Id. B 2036(a)(l), (b)(2). 
272. See id 5 2032A(a)(l)(A). 
273. Id. 5 2036@)(2). 
274. Id. 5 2036(b)(1), (2). 
275. Jensen,supranote19,at201 ~[Clonflictamongsiblingsiscanmon.");seealsoKeanethKaye, 
Penetrating the CycleofSustainedC~nfricf, Bus. HonxzoNs, Spring 1991, reprintedin FAMILY BUSINESS 
SOURCEBOOK 0: 355,369-70 (Craig E. Aronoff ct al. eds., 1996). 
276. See 1.R.C. 5 672(c)(l). 
277. See, e.g., Estate of Fmel v. United State& 553 F.2d 637 (Ct. C1. 1977); cf. Estate of Walt v. 
Comm'r, 101 T.C. 300f1993). 
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definition of family were adopted, however, a taxpayer's cousin would be 
defmed as "related" to the taxpayer, and any ability to remove and replace 
with the cousin-trustee would trigger estate tax inclusion under 
5 2036(a)(2).278 The overall impact of the adoption of a broad definition of 
family would be the inclusion of more transfers in the gross estate than under 
current law. Although Congress was concerned with the ability of taxpayers 
to retain control over transferred assets through a trustee who functions, in 
effect, as the transferor's al~er-ego:'~ Congress did not intend to implement 
a per se rule against a trustee who is related to the transferor within any 
degree of consanguinity. Such a broad definition of family is inconsistent 
with legislative intent. 
b. Impact on Estate Tax Payment 
If the 8 2032A definition of family were adopted for all estate tax 
purposes, more transfers would be included in the gross estate than are 
currently included, but it ~ l s o  would become easier to qualify for an extension 
of time to pay estate taxes under 6 6166. Consider this variation on 
Hypothetical 7. 
HmatheKcai 12. Assume the same facts as in Hveothetical7. above. exceDt that of the 
46ahareholden other than Dora Ewing, one isi;= stepson,~oger '~ucas; one is her 
steoson'swife. Abbv Ga1e:one is her ne~hew. John Ewine:one isl~crsister-&-law. Maw 
. . 
~ L c k ;  and one is ier daughterin-law, Gloe Cox. 'Iheother 44 shareholders are nit 
related to Dora Ewing in any way. 
As in Hypothetical 7, in this hypothetical, the holdings of Dora Ewing alone 
do not rise to the level that would make Company Y a closely held corporation 
with respect to her.'*' It is closely held, however, if it has 45 or fewer 
~hrueholders,2~' with the taxpayer's holdings being aggregated with the 
holdings of members of his or her family.282 If 5 2032A's uniform definition 
applies, then Dora Ewing is deemed to own the shares held by her stepson, 
Roger Lucas; her stepson's wife, Abby Gale; her nephew, John Ewing; her 
278. See supra note 35. 
279. See supra Pm lI.A 
280. ~ e e 1 . ~ ~ . $ 6 1 6 6 @ ) ( l ) ( ~ ) ( l ) ( d e c e d e n t ~ s s ~ d  
business interest for pumoses of 8 6166(a)(I) if decedent's moss estate includesrwenwuercent or more of 
the value ofthe voting sfock of tfte corporation). 
281. Id. $ 6166@)(lXC)(ii). 
282. Id. 5 6166@)(2)(D). 
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sister-in-law, Mary Mack; andher daughter-in-law, Gloe Cox. Thus Company 
Y would be deemed to bave 45 total shareholders (i.e., Dora Ewing and the 44 
individuals who are not "related" to her). Company Y therefore would be a 
closely held business with respect to Dora Ewing within the meaning of 
8 6166(b)(l)(C)(ii)zs3 and Dora Ewing's estate would be eligible for the 
deferred payment provisions of $ 6  166. 
Hypothetical 12 raises the question of whether adoption of a uniform 
definition of family based on 2032A would make it too easy to qualify for 
the extension of time to pay estate taxes under 4 6166. The extension was 
developed for those estates that might have liquidity problems because of the 
unique nature of family-owned businesses.2s4 But the shareholders in 
Hypothetical 12 are related to each other distantly or by marriage only and 
perhaps do not need the same amount of time to pay taxes that is needed by 
the owner of businesses like the ones legislators had in mind when enacting 
5 2032A.285 A business that is owned by a taxpayer; her stepson, Roger 
Lucas; her stepson's wife, Abby Gale; her nephew, John Ewing; her sister-in- 
law, Mary Mack; her daughter-in-law, Gloe Cox; and 44 unrelated people 
likely does not have the same characteristics as the classic family farm or 
small family business. For that reason adopting a broad definition of family 
wouldresult in taxpayers such as Dora Ewing in Hypothetical 12 receiving an 
extension of time to pay taxes when they do not need extra time to pay. 
B. Eliminate All Family-Based Preferences and Penalties 
Instead of adoptingauniformdefinitionof family for estate tax purposes, 
another response to the many conflicting estate tax definitions of family would 
be eliminating all estate tax preferences and penalties that depend on family 
 relationship^.'^^ Such elimination is not desirable, however, because it would 
lead to both abusive behavior by taxpayers seeking to evade taxation and 
financial hardship for many estates. 
To illustrate the consequences of eliminating all estate tax preferences 
and penalties for families, consider again Hypothetical 2. In that case, Dora 
Ewing's ownership of Company Y stockcauses the full value ofthe Company 
283. See id. 8 6166(b)(l)(C)(ii). 
284. See supra Part U.C. 
285. Seesupra Pan U.B. 
286. Somethingsimilar was suggested in aqufffionby ProfessmDarleneKennedy in response roan 
earlier version of this paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Assodation, Las 
Vegas, Nevada on June 4,2005. 
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Y stock to be included in her gross estate.287 This is because under the 
constructive ownership rules of 8 318, she owns her father's 95% interest, 
making Company Y a controlled corporation with respect to her?" If, 
however, "family" were made irrelevant for purposes of 5 2036@)(2), then 
Dora Ewing's father's stock ownership would not be attributed to her:" 
Company Y would not be a controlled corporation with respect to her and the 
value of the transferred shares of Company Y stockwouldnot be included in 
her gross estate?" 
A uniformly broad definition of family also creates opportunities for 
abusive transactions under 5 2036(a)(2). Undercurrent law, assets transferred 
by a taxpayer will be included in the taxpayer's gross estate where he or she 
retains the power to remove a trustee and replace him or her with a person 
who is related or subordinate to the taxpayer within the meaning of 
5 672(c).Z9' If the prohibition on the removal and replacement of "related" 
trustees were eliminated, however, a taxpayer could appoint, remove and 
replace as trustee his or her spouse or child, among others, without any 
negative tax con~equences.2'~ Nothing would prevent the taxpayer from 
treating the trust as a will substitute (or worse, an alter ego), thus eroding the 
purpose of the estate tax law which aims to include in the taxpayer's gross 
estate transfers that are testamentary in nat~re.2'~ 
If all preferences for families were eliminated in the estate tax law, there 
would be no special valuation of real estate under 5 2032:'" which in turn 
would cause real property to be valued at higher levels than under current 
law.295 Similarly, with no extensions of time to pay estate taxes under 
5 6166y6 family-business owners might have to liquidate the business in 
order to pay in a timely fashion any estate tax owed.297 Congressional intent 
287. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying teat. 
288. I.R.C. 5 2036(b); see supra notes 29-3 1 and aocompan$ng to*. 
289. See I.R.C. $ 2036(b). 
290. See id. $2036(a)(l), @)(2). 
291. See id. $ 672(c)(1). 
292. See id. 8 2036(a)(2). 
293. See, e.g., id. $$2035-2038;see also Willbanks,supra,note 18, at 5 (''Once it decided toretain 
the fedaal state tax, Con- recognized the possibilities of tax avoidance through inter vivos gi& and 
adopted a gift tax in 1924."). 
294. See supra Part LB. 
295. See supra note 58. 
296. See supra Pan LC. 
297. See I.R.C. 5 6075(a) (due date for payment of estate taxes ordinarily is nine montbs afler 
decedent's death); see also supra note 105. 
20051 CONFLICTING MEANINGS OF FAMILY IN ESTATE TAX LAW 57 
to "solve the handicaps of new and small businesses" would be t h ~ a r t e 8 ~ '  if 
farmers and small business owners had fewer estate tax benefits. 
C. Eliminate the Family-Based Preferences 
As an alternative to eliminating all family-based preferences and 
penalties, it may be appropriate to consider eliminating only the preferential 
rules, in light of the purposes of $5 2036,2032A and 6166 and contemporary 
experiences of the family. Of the three Code sections, 5 2036 is unique in its 
concern about taxpayers who seek to evade estate taxation through'transfers 
of assets over which they (or their surrogates) maintain control.z99 Section 
2036 uses concepts of family and "related" taxpayers in order to facilitate 
efficient application ofthe law. Otherwise, there wouldneed to he a case-hy- 
case inquiry into every transfer of property over which the decedent retains 
voting rights or unrestricted rights to remove or replace a trustee. The 
definitions of "controlled corp~ration'"~~ and "related or s~bordinate"'~' 
supply predictable bright line tests that allow taxpayers to determine ex ante 
what arrangements will trigger estate tax inclusion under $2036. 
In contrast to $ 2036's concern with control, both 5 2032A and 9 6166 
bestow benefits on certain taxpayers-small business owners-who are 
engaged in business activities that Congress has labeled as more 
Given the purposes of each of $5 2032A and 6166, however, it is perhaps 
inappropriate to limit the estate tax benefits to family transfers (in the case of 
$2032A)30br apply favorable mles to families that do not apply to unrelated 
taxpayers (in the case of $ 6166's methodology for determining the number 
of owners of a business).304 After all, the estate of a small business owner 
faces the same liquidity concemsregardless ofwhether the decedent transfers 
real property used in the business to a family member (and "qualified heir")'o5 
or to a long-term (but unrelated) business partner. Similarly a business owned 
by a group of, say, 50 unrelated taxpayers may function in fact more like a 
closely-held business than one owned by a taxpayer, his or her six children 
298. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
299. See supra P& 1I.A. 
300. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
301. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text. 
302. See supra Part II.BC. 
303. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text. 
304. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
305. See supra notes69-77 and accompanying text. 
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and 44 grandchildren, although the latter would qualify as a closely-held 
business under current law and the former would not.)06 
Section 2032A's and 9 6166's reliance on family-based tests seems 
especially inappropriate given the changing nature of the American 
The definitions of family are under-inclusive and, as Hypothetical 9 
illustrates, otherwise qualifying estates may be ineligible for benefits solely 
because of a lack of formalized marital relationship between taxpayers, for 
example. Lawmakers could consider two possible solutions to thisproblern: 
either adopt a case-by-case analysis that could accommodate nontraditional 
family arrangements or eIiminate the family-based benefits under $8 2032A 
and 6166. The first of these alternatives, a case-by-case analysis, would be 
cumbersome and unpredictable. Taxpayers would be unable to forecast with 
certainty whether a particular relationship would be determined to be 
sufficiently "family-like" to make certain transfers eligible for favorable 
treatment under 8 2032A or 8 6166. The second alternative, eliminating the 
family-based benefits under these Code sections, would be politically 
unfeasible, given the importance of the small business owner and family 
farmer in congressional rhet~ric.)~' Taxpayers would hardly welcome 
elimination of the special valuation rules and extension of time to pay taxes. 
D. Increase the Estate Tax Exemption 
As an alternative to estate tax repeal, congressional leaders are discussing 
the possibility of increasing the estate tax exemption to an amount from $1.5 
million to between $8 million and $10 million per t a ~ ~ a y e r . ~ ~ V f  the 
306. Seesupra Part LC.2, 
307. See su~ra  Part IflB. 
308. See su& Part II.BE. 
309. Brodv Mullins. Senators Discuss Comromise Bill For the Estofe Tax, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 
2005, at B2. Such an approach is similar to the system pmposed in Crawford, s u p  note 56. Professor 
Michael Graetz of Yale Law School has proposed a per-person estate tax exemption of $5 million, or$lO 
million for married couples. See David Cay Johnston, Few Wealthy Formers Owe Estate Taxes, Report 
Saw. N.Y. TIMES. July 10.2005. at A21 (describing views of Professor Graetz). Forcornmentaryon the 
, . - 
economic lmpl~cations of the proposal to raise the exemption to 58 million per person, sce Joel Friedrnnn 
& RuthCarlitz.Kylt'slore Tar ' C o n ~ p t . r u r n i s e " P ~ ~ l E r f r e m e ~ C o ~ ~ / ~  (2005), http. w w . c b p p . a ~  7- 
7-05lax pdf,seeolro Dustin Stampcr,Boucrcr. KylAgr~eonF~totr  TL? 'Po,omrlerr,' 1 0 8 T , ~ x N o ~ t ~  263. 
263 t2005)tdcsc"btn~ serrnnrnt brween Senator JohnKyl R-Ariz.,andSenalor Wax Baurus. D.Mont., 
. . - - 
to design estate tax reform bill hat  reains extension of time to pay estate taxes, inter alia, while raising 
exemption amount and lowering maximum tax rate). A recent version of the proposal includes a $3.5 
million exemption and a top mtate tax rate of fitloen percent. Editorial, The Stnfe of the Estde Tar, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 8,2005, at A14. A New York Times editorial criticizes a $3.5 million exemption as "overly 
generous,"and suggeststhat "a $2 million exemption would beample toprotect the hard-working familie, 
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exemption were so increased, far fewer taxpayers would be forcedto navigate 
the complex and conflicting estate tax definitions of family. By way of 
illustration, in 2002,98,359 estate tax returns were filed, but only 1.9% of 
those were for gross estates valued at $10 million or more? ' W f  that 1.9%, 
a full one-third of the returns were for nontaxable estates?" The other two- 
thirds contributed more than 36% of the total estate tax revenue for 2002."2 
Presumably estates of the relatively few ultra-wealthy taxpayers can afford 
sophisticated tax advice and interpreting the conflicting estate tax definitions 
of family is not a significant burden.)" 
Even though fewer estates would be subject to the complexities of the 
estate tax if the exemption were raised to $10 million, three important 
concerns would remain. First, the concept of horizontal equity in taxation 
demands that "similarly situated individuals should be taxed similarly."'14 If 
the tax law is too complicated, only those who seek (and receive) quality tax 
advice will have lower tax  bill^.''^ Insofar as all taxpayers have the equal 
opportunity to seek advice, there is no violation of the principle of horizontal 
equity. But the only people who benefit &om such a systemare the advice- 
giving lawyers and accountants-not taxpayers. Second, the cost of 
complying with and enforcing the law would remain extremely high?I6 In 
entrepreneurs and farmersthat estatetax fces claim to care about most." Id. TheNov York Timeseditorial 
also supwm a hiaha top rate, explaining that a hider rate would 'keep the tax faii' whereas "a fifteen 
~. 
percent tar rat? would transhte to a mnerix percent levy on a $20 m~llion cstatc." Id. 
3 10. SlatistlcsoflncmeDivlsion. lntemd Revenue Srrv, EstateTax Rerums Filed in2002 (?004). 
hrv. www.irs.govluxsta1dindta~~tats/arti~I~O,,id2,OO.html. 
31 I The rcst likely qual.fied for the charitable or mariul dcdurtion. See id. 
. ~ 
312. See id. 
3 13. For a general example ofthesophisticated level of legal advice thata wealthy decedent'sestate 
Can afford, see JONATHAN 0. BLATTMACHR, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO WEALTH PRESERVATION AND 
ESTATBPLANNINO (2000). 
3 14. Willbanks, mpro note 18, at 9. On the role of harizonul equity in laxation gennally, ,a 
hllCll.\ELA. LIVLNGSTON,TAXATION LAW,PLANNU~G&POLICY,~~XW-XXXV~ (2003);~eeolsoChrist0phn 
T. Nixon, Should Congress Revise fke Tax Code to Extend the Some Tm Benefrls to Some-Sex ~ o ~ ~ l e r  
as Are Currently Gmnted lo M m i e d  Couples? An Analysb in Light ofHoriwnfal Equity, 23 S. ILL. U. 
L.I. 41 (1998) (comparing tax treahnent of same-sex couples and opposite-sex married couples). 
315. See James R. Repetti, Demooncy, Taxer, and Wealth, 76N.Y.U. L. REV. 825,868-69 (2001) 
(complex Code provisions "createan equityproblem becausethqr providethe greatest benefitto thosewho 
seek sophisticated tax advice. To the extent that the estate tax does impose an unacceptable burdar, 
policymakersneed to identify the benefits provided by small businesses and family farmsand to deermine 
the best way to target tax relief to those companies providing the benefits."). 
316. ProfessorStephameWil1banharticulatesanim~tgoalofanytaxsystemas"adminish;ltive 
feasibility," explaining thaf "[iJt should not impose significant costs for enforcemenf compliance or 
planning. Other principle include: simplicity, stability, and direcmess, i.e., how visible is the taxto those 
who pay it?' Willbanks,supro note 18, at 10. 
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fact, the cost could even increase, if auditing more large estates required 
greater commitment of governmental resources. Finally, the loss of estate tax 
revenue would be ~ignificant.)'~ Raising the estate tax exemption, therefore, 
may be a partial solution, but it is incomplete in at least three important ways. 
E. Revise Terminology to Achieve Statuto~y Integrity 
1. Generally 
Each of the proposals considered so far in this Part-adopting a uniform 
definition of family, eliminating all preferences and penalties for families, 
eliminating only the family-based preferences, and raising the estate tax 
exemption-has significant flaws. No single defmition of family discussed 
here would effectuate legislative intent:" and it is unlikely that any single 
definition would be appropriate for all estate tax purposes, given the diverse 
purposes for which the laws were enacted. Eliminating all family-based estate 
tax rules likely would result in systematic over-taxation or under-taxation, 
using legislative intent and existing levels of taxation as a reference. One 
variation on this proposal, eliminating only the beneficial provisions of 
$$ 2032A and 6166, would be politically unpopular, if not impossible to 
implement. The option of raising the estate tax exemption would minimize 
the number of taxpayers who would be subject to the conflicting meanings of 
family in estate tax law, but such an increase would not eliminate the law's 
complexity. 
In light ofthese unsatisfactory options, thebest (and perhaps the simplest) 
solution is revising the statutes to eliminate internal conflict over terms like 
"family" and "related" persons and to reflect each Code section's unique 
purposes. Within abody of law, words shouldbe usedconsistently and, to the 
extent possible, in ways that comport with lay under~tanding.~'~ Statutory 
integrity is a fundamental requirement for public confidence in the legal 
system. As Ronald Dworkin observes, 
317. See Friedman & Carlitz, suprn note 309. Over the ten year period, from 2012 to 2021, the 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities estimates that raising the estate tax exemption to $8 million per 
person would cost up to $700 million in lost revenue. Id. 
3 18. See supra Parts El, IVA. 
319. See supra note 7. Although this subpan outlines some of the most significant changes that 
would need to be made in connection with the proposal to achieve statutory integrity, a comprehensive 
legislative proposal is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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Internally compromised statutes cannot he seen as flowing *om any single coherent 
scheme of principle; on the contrary, they serve the incompatible aim of a rulebook 
c o n r r n u ~ t ~ ~  which is to ~om~romise~conv~c t ions  al g lines of power. They conuadlct 
rather than conlirm the commitment necessary to make a large and diverse poltrical 
society a genuine rather than a bare c o m i &  the promise &at law will bechosen, 
changed, developed, and interpreted in an overall principled way."' 
If it is not possible to use terms like "family" and "related" persons 
consistently across Code sections, then it is appropriate to consider using 
distinct terms for their unique and lirnitedpurposes. The proposedterms also 
would more closely effectuate legislative intent. 
2. Revisions to I.R C. $2036 
In the case of $ 2036(a)(l), its estate tax inclusion mle does not contain 
any reference to "family" and would not need to he revised. Instead the 
revisions would need he made to the definition of "controlled corporation" of 
$ 2036(b)(2) that is made applicable to 8 2036(a)(1). The definition of 
"controlled corporation" could be revised to use a self-contained attribution 
mle, instead of incorporating the attribution rule of $ 3  18 by reference. The 
self-contained attribution rule could refer to members of the "Attribution 
Group" instead of members ofthe decedent's "family.'"2' That way, it would 
320. RoNALDDw~RKIN,LAw'~EMFIRE~I~(~~~~). AlthoughStamtoryint~rityas~~edhererefem 
to consistency in language and interpretation, WilliamEskridge and Philip Frickey emphasize Dworkin's 
interest in moral consistency. William N. Eskridge, Jr. &Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and 
Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691, 721-22 (1987). They cbim that 
Dworkin would "rpluirell lawmakers to w tomake the total set of laws morally coherent. . . . 'Ihe courts' 
role is to interpret a"tho&tive statemengof law (the Cmtimtion, statutes, c i m o n  lawprecedents) in 
light of the underlying principles of the communih: Thus, in the 'hard cases' of stamtorv internretation. 
the best interpretation is the one that is most consonant with the underlying values of soiiery a id  makes 
the statute the best statute it can be (within the limitations imposed by the language)." Id. (citations 
omitted). 
321. A newly-revised 5 2036(b)(2) might read as follws: 
(2) Control!ed curporarion. For purposes of paragraph ( I ) ,  a corporation shall bs rrratcd as a 
connoilcd cwpor-ation ii, 31 any ttme afrm the transfer of !he propmy and duioe the thee-ydar 
. .  ~ 
period ending on the date of the decedent's death, the decedent owned (with the application of 
paragraph (3)),or had the tight (either alone w inconjunction with any other person) to vote, stack 
possessing at least twenty percent of the total combined w i n g  power of all clssses of stock. 
(3)Attribution. An individual shall beconsideredas awningthe stackawoeddirectlyorindirectly, 
by or for any member of the Attribution Group. The Attribution Group shall consist of the 
individual's spouse (other thanaspouse who is legallyseparated fiDm theindividual under a decree 
of divorce or separate maintenance), and the individual's children, grandchildren, and parents. 
Further sections would need to beadded to provide for amibution to and frompaherships, estates, trusts, 
and CorpOratio~, as well as the heatment of stock options as stock ownership for limited purposcs ofthe 
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be plain that the language of $ 2036(b)(2) should not be read and was not 
intended to harmonize with any other Code section. 
Similarly, with respect toinclusion under $2036(a)(2),that section would 
not need to be revised. Instead, the Service should withdraw Revenue Ruling 
95-58:22 applicable to the interpretation of $ 2036(a)(2), and issue a new 
ruling that prohibits removal of a trustee and replacement by a person who is 
a member of the "Prohibited Class," for example, instead of a person who is 
"related or ~ubordinate.'"~~ Alternately the Service could withdraw Revenue 
Ruling 95-58 and add an example to the regulations under $ 2036, making 
clear that a transferor-decedent risks estate tax inclusion where he or she 
retains the right to remove a trustee and replace him or her with a member of 
the Prohibited Cla~s? '~ 
As part of the statutory change of terms to "Attribution Group" and 
"Prohibited Class," those terms could be drafted to include any person who is 
defined for purposes of local law as a registered domestic partner or "spouse" 
of the taxpayer?'' This would allow the estate tax inclusion rule to reach 
transfers in the context of family-like relationships that presently are not 
recognized as "family" for federal tax purposes. Including domestic partners 
and state-law spouses within the $ 2036 definition would be consistent with 
the legislature's concern over taxpayer control?26 Furthermore, insofar as the 
revised $2036 would apply only to domestic partnerships and mamages that 
are recognized by the state, there should be little, if any, evidentiary concern 
over who is a registered domestic partner or spouse for state law purposes. 
nc,, 5 2036(b)(3). Ses 1R.C g 318(3)(4) (penon w~th option to acqulre sta'k is neated as mRnrng that 
suck,. Thecurrent 6 2036(bi(3)(~~titled"caodination withsection 2035") wouldnwdto bercnumhred. 
322. Rev. ~ u i .  95-58, 1995-2 CB. 191. 
323. The Prohibited Class could be defined as the taxpayer's spouse, father, mother, issue, brother 
~ ~ 
or sistrr, an) employre oithe laxpaycr, any corpontion oremployeeufscorparation in which rhcholdiqs 
of 2 tn*pa,rr lor the pm~culhrt111>1 inqucrt~on)"are s i~if i rant  hum the viewpoint of\ot~ngconrrd"; and 
. . 
"subordinate" employees of a corporation in which thc taxpayer is an executive. Seesupra notes 39-43. 
324. To Treasuv Regulation 20.2036-I@), for example, there could be added the following new 
paragraph: "(4) The phrase fight. . . to designate the pason m persons who shall possess or enjoy the 
h-ansfened propmy or theincometherefrom' includes aresewed right toremove and replace a tzustee who 
is a member of the Prohibited Class." The "Prohibited Class" would thm be defined as insupra note 323. 
325. If the terms were dnfied brcadly, the ssond sentmce of the new 5 2036@)(3) would provide 
that the Attribution Gmup "shall consist of the individual's spouse (other than a spouse who is legally 
separated from the individual under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance), any person who is 
registend as a domestic paimer under the state or local laws of the taxpayer's domicile, any penon who 
is defined as the taxpayer's spouse for purposes of slate law, and the individual'schildlen, grandchildren, 
and parents." The definition of Prohibited Class would be expanded similarly. 
326. See supra Part U.A. 
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3. Revisions to I.RC. $2032A 
Because it relies heavily on "family" as a defined term to implement its 
substantive rule, $2032A would need more extensive revisions to achieve the 
desired statutory integrity. Apart from the purely semantic change of 
replacing "family" with a term such as "Qualified Heir Group," it would be 
appropriate to consider expanding the definition's substance in light of 
9 2032A's underlying policy goal of providing tax relief to the family farmer 
or small business owner.)27 The "Qualified Heir Group" could be defined as 
all of the persons who are included under existing law as members of a 
taxpayer's "family"'28 as well as any other individual whose total real estate 
and farm holdings are below a certain fair market value. That would allow a 
decedent to leave real property to a long-time employee who, fox example, 
spends 30 years working on the farm before the decedent's death, without 
extending the special valuation rule in cases where a decedent's family 
decides to sell the family farm to a large agribusiness conglomerate. As a 
matter of practical politics, it is extremely unlikely that Congress would 
expand the definition of "Qualified Heir Group" to include persons who are 
registered as domestic partners or recognized as spouses for state law 
purposes. From a policy perspective, however, renaming and expanding the 
definition of a "qualified heir" to include domestic partners (as well as their 
descendants) is consistent with the statute's desire to foster small farms and 
business activities. There is no logical reason that the tax benefits should be 
limited to transfers to relations by blood or federally-recognized ma1~iage.3~~ 
327. See supra Part U.B. 
328. Forpurposes ofthe current 5 2032A, a taxpayer-decedent's "Family" consists of (A) anyof the 
taxpayer's ancestors; (B) the taxpayet's spouse; (C) any lineal descendant of the taxpayer; (D) a lineal 
descendant of the taxpayer's spouse; (E) any descendam of the taxpayer's lrarents (i.e.. a taxnaver's 
. .  . . . 
siblings, nieces and nephcur, etc.); and (F) any spouse of any lineal descendant of the raxpayn, t!lr 
taxpayer's spuuseor any derrmdant afths taps)er 's  parsntr. Scr $?,pro nates 72-77 and amompanyng 
text 
329. The tern 'Qualified Heir Gmup" would apply for purposesof the fiftypercent and twenty-five 
percent threshold tests. See I.R.C. 5 s  2032A@)(I)(B) (fifty percent test), 2032A(b)(l)(C) (twenty-he 
percent test). For example, 3 2032A(bXI) could be revised as follows: 
(b) Qualified real propew.- 
(1) In general.-For purposes of this section, the term "qualified real property" means real 
property locard ,n the Unwd Slates uhlch was acqu~red from or puscd from the decedent to a 
member oftheQual~fiedHc!r Groupand wh~rh.onthe~fateofthedcccdent'idrath,uas br. in~ wed 
for a qualified use by the decedent or a member of the Qualified Heir Group, but only if- 
(A) fifty percent or more of the adjusted value of the decedent's g m s  estate mnsists of the 
adjusted value of real or personal property which- 
(i) on the date of the decedent's death, was being used im a qualified use by the 
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4. Revisions to I.RC. f 6166 
As with $ 2032q the substantive meaning of $ 6166 derives in 
substantial part from its definition of family, and so revising the definition 
entails significant changes to the statute. As with 2036, the definition of 
family is incorporated by reference to a separate Code se~tion:~%nd so 
achieving the desired statutory integrity will require rewriting $ 6  166 to have 
a self-contained attribution rule. In particular, 8 6166 might be rewritten to 
attribute to a taxpayer the holdings of his or her "Closely Held Business 
Associates" instead of his or her "family" as defined in $ 267(c)(4)."' The 
Closely Held Business Associates could include all persons defined under the 
current $6166 as a "member" of a decedent's "family."33z The term would be 
applicable only for the limited purposes of $ 6166 and would not bear any 
resemblance to terminology used in any other Code section. Again, though, 
to the extent that Congress is concerned about the longevity of small 
businesses, it may be theoretically appropriate, if politically unfeasible, to 
include registered domestic partners and state-law spouses within that group. 
decedent or a member of the Qualified Heir Gmup, and 
(ii) was acauked from or oasses from the decedent to a member of the Oualified Heir 
. . 
Group. 
(B) twenty-five percent or more of the adjusted value of the gross estate consists of the 
adjusted valueofreal propertywhich meets the requirements ofsubparagraphs(AXii) and(C), 
(C) during the eight-year period ending on thedate of the decedent's death there have been 
periods aggregating five years or more during which- 
(i) such real property was owned by the decedent or a member of the Qualified Heir 
Group and used for a qualified use by the decedent or a member of the Qualified Heir 
Groua. and 
. . 
(ii) there was mterial participation by the decedent or a member of the Quatitied Heir 
Grout, in the arremtion of the farm or other business. and 
(D) such real &opew is designated in the agreement refened to in subsection (d)(2). 
330. Seesupra note 125 and accompanying text. 
331. Seesupra note 125 and accompanying text. 
332. Forpumosesofthe cunents 6166, thetaxpayer's"fam3y"is defined byreferenceto 5 267(c)(4) 
~. . . 
as the taxpayn's sibl~ngs, 9 p O U X .  ancesiors, and lineal deccmdanrs See supra notes 125-27 and 
accompanying ten. A rensed 6 6166(b1(2)(1>) n u b t  rzad in pcninmt pan as follows: 
-0) certain interests hdd by others. 'All stock and all p&nership;nterests held by thedecedent 
ot by any member of the Closely Held Business Associates shall be treated as owned by the 
decedent. 
(E) Closely Held Business Associates. The Closely Hdd Businas Associate with respect to 
any individual shall include that individual's brothers and sisters (whether by the whole or half 
blood), spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants. 
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Ultimately the estate tax law's account of "family" will need to be broadened 
to include a greater range of the relationships that people call by that name. 
Family is both a burden and a benefit for estate tax purposes. Family is 
a burden to the extent that attribution rules trigger estate tax inclusion under 
§ 2036(a)(l),j3' or if the ability to replace a removed trustee with a relative 
runs afoul of the prohibition on the removal of related or subordinate parties 
under 5 2036(a)(2).1)' Family is a benefit insofar as it may cause #special 
valuation rules to be available under 6 2032A335 or for an estate to have more 
time to pay taxes under 5 6166.1" Each of these already intricate Code 
sections is complicated by a unique defmition of "family" or "related" 
persons. The definitions range from 5 2036(b)(2)'s narrow classification of 
spouse, children, parents and grandparents as "related" for purposes of 
$8 2036@)(2) and 2036(a)(l),"' to 5 2032A's broad grouping of ancestors, 
descendants, step-children, siblings and spouses as members of the same 
"family."33s 
The variety in the estate tax definitions of family reflects, to some extent, 
the diversity in the composition of contemporary American families. In a 
society in which twocareer couples, divorce, remarriage and 
multigenerational families are c0mmon,3~~ laws that seekto tax the transfer of 
wealth necessarily will have a certain level of complexity. Recent family law 
scholarship, with its emphasis on connectedness and interdependency, 
provides a useful lens for examining the strengths and shortcomings of the 
existing tax r ~ l e s . 3 ~ ~  But insofar as family law theorists criticize the relatively 
low value accorded to women's caretaking activities, those theorists should 
have little quarrel with the estate tax laws which do not tax the fruits of those 
caretaking activities. 
In response to the complexity of the estate tax rules, a uniform definition 
of family could be adopted. The main problem with a single definition, 
however, is the systematic over-taxation or under-taxation that likely would 
333. See supra Part LA.1. 
334. See supra Part IA.2. 
335. Seesupra Part LB. 
336. Seesupra Part IC. 
337. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
338. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. 
339. See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text. 
340. See s u p ~ a  Part UI. 
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re~ult.9~' Although only two specific uniform definitions are discussed in 
detail in this Article, it is unlikely that any uniform definition would be 
appropriate, given the diverse purposes for which $5 2036,2032A and 6166 
were enacted The second proposal, the elimination of all family-based 
preferences and penalties, is similarly inadequate. Such a change would lead 
to abusive behavior by taxpayers or financial hardship for many estates. The 
third proposal, eliminating only the family-based preferences, may be more 
appropriate in light of the purposes for which the Code sections were enacted, 
but this would be politically unpopular, and perhaps imp~acticable?~Vhe 
fourth proposal, doing nothing in response to the conflicting meanings of 
family, is a partial (if incomplete) solution. With the scheduled increases in 
the estate tax and perhaps even greater increases to come,'44 
inconsistencies in the estate tax defmitions of terms like "family" and 
"related" may become less important if they will apply to fewer estates?45 For 
the few estates to which the law would still apply, it is truethat there exists a 
developed jurisprudence on what constitutes a controlled c~rporation:~~ who 
is "related" to a taxpayer in a tax sense,'47 when an estate is eligible for the 
special valuation ofreal estate"8 and under what circumstances an estate may 
receive extra time to pay its tax Tax lawyers and other advisors are 
generally familiar with these rules and can, with careful study, advise clients 
on how to structure their affairs to minimize estate ta~es.9~' 
341. Seesupro Part N.A. 
342. See supra Pan 11. 
343. Seesupra note 167. 
344. See supra Part W.D. 
345. Accading torecent Congressional Budget Officeestimates, had the cunent $19 million estate 
tax exemption been in effect in 2000, fewer than one percent of all estates (approximately 13,770) would 
have been subject to any estate tax. Edmund L. Andrews, Death Tar? Double Ter.' For Most. ItS No 
Tar, N.Y. TIMES, Au& 14,2005, at B4. 
346. See, e.g., 1 BORIS L BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
CORPO~AT~ONSAND SHAREHOLDERS 19.02 (7th ed. 2000); Ringe1,supra note 207,211-12; STEPHENS ET 
AL., supra note 20, fl4.08[6][dJ. 
347. See, e g ,  9 JACOB MERTENSLAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 3736 (Shane A. Ha* ed., 
2005) ("Granta Taxable Because of Power to Control Beneficial Enjoyment"); 47A C.J.S. Internal 
Revenue $455 (2005). 
348. See, e.g., Brockman v. Comm'r, 903 F.2d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 1990) (definition ofWqualified 
use"); Heffley v. Comm'r. 884 F.2d 279, 283-84 (7th Cir. 1989) (same); Bmck v. United States, 86 
U.S.T.C. U 13,692 (N.D. Ind 1986) (same); Estate of Abellv. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 696,699 (1984) (same): 
note 20,7 4.04. 
349. See, e.g., STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 20,B 2.02[31[cl. 
350. As LeamedHandfamously remarked, "there is nothing sinister in so arranging ate's affairsas 
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Yet in light of the significant conflict in the estate tax definitions of 
family, doing nothing is an unacceptable solutioa Unless the statutes are 
revised to achieve sane degree of integrity, they will continue to contribute 
to the general public's sense that the tax laws are unfair and overly 
c~mplex.'~' This Article proposes using terms like Attribution Group, 
Qualified Heir Group and Closely Held Business Associates instead of terms 
like "family" and "related" persons. Although the changes are semantic in 
some sense, they embody the larger belief that statutes ought to use words 
consistently and in ways that comport withlay understanding. This will also 
align the definitions more closely with legislative intent. The rigorous 
demands of statutory integrity require nothing less. 
to keep taxes as low as possible. . . for nobody owes any public dutyto pay more than the law demands.'' 
Comm'r v. Nwman, 159 F.2d. 848,850-85 1 (1947) (Hand, C.J., dissenting). Advacates of maintaining 
the status quo in the tax laws may point to the predictability in the tax laws @a ao impoaant policy goal. 
See 0klahonna Tax Cornrn'n v.  khrckasaw ~ i t l o n .  515 U.S. 450. 459 (1995)  ax adminirrn&an 
rcquirr..i predictability."); seealso William M. Gentry & Helen F. Ladd.Srore Tax Slrucrurrond.Ilu/~,o/e 
Policy Objectives, 47 NAT'LTAX J. 747,747 (1994) (predictabilityis important in tax policy). Clarity and 
stanttory integrity would seem to be more pressing policy goals in this case, however. 
351. McLaughlin&Assac., Vo1crs21o ISayEsrnleTaxis "Unfair"-EvenForBiIIion(1ires(2001), 
hnp:llwww.mclaughlinonlinee~om/newspolVnp2OOllOlO525~t.h~. 
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APPENDIX 
Who Is a Member of the Family for Estate Tax Purposes?3s2 
352. This chart does not include four categories of persons who potentially are "related or 
transferor 
Any lineal descendant of the 
transferor's spouse 
Any spouse of any lineal 
descendant of the transferor 
Any spouse of any lineal 
descendant of the 
transferor's spouse 
Any ancestor of the 
transferor 
subordinate" parties for purposes of $ 2036(a)(2) but who &e not otherwise considered "related" or 
members ofthe "family" for purposes of the other Code sections. Those cataories are (a) an employee of 
the grantorlhansferor; (b) a corporation in which the holdings of the @antor-and the mst  ares&nificant 
from the viewpoint of voting control; (e) anemployeeof a corporation in which the holdmgs of the grantor 
and the t m t  are significant fmm the viewpoint of voting control; and (d) a subordinate employee of a 
corporation in which the grantor is an executive. I.R.C. $5 2036(a)(2), 672(c). 
No 
No 
No 
YedS6 
353. The spouse is a member of the defined class unless the spause is legally separated fmm tbe 
individual under a decree of divone or separate maintenance. Id. $5 2036(b)(2), 318(a)(l )(A)(& 
354. To be a member of the defined class, the wnsferor's spouse must be living with the grantor. 
Id. $9 2036(a)(2), 672(c). 
355. A lineal descendant is a member of the defined class if he or she is a child or grandchild of the 
transferor. Id. $§ 2036@)(2), 3 18(a)(l)(A)(ii). 
356. An ancestor is a member of the defined class, if the ancestor is the mother a father of the 
transferor. Id. $8 2036(b)(2), 318(a)(l)(A)(ii). 
357. An ancestor is amember ofthe defined class, ifthe ancestor is the transferor's mother or father. 
Id. $$2036(a)(2), 672(c). 
No ' 
No 
No 
Yes357 . 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
- 
No 
Yes 
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358. The spouse of an ancestor of the transferor is not a member of the defined class, unless that 
spouse is the hansferor's own mothaor father. Id. $00 2036(a)(2), 6721~). 
Any descendant of an 
individual's sibling (nieces, 
nephews, etc.) 
No No Yes No 
